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Abstract
We present the modelling and refinement of the Mondex Electronic Purse “challenge problem”. Our
approach uses the well-established Vienna Development Method. Abstract and concrete models are
presented, with a refinement step that addresses error detection and recovery in the implementation. We
exercise the range of verification and validation techniques associated with VDM (animation, testing and
proof.) The study suggests future developments in machine-assisted proof to support the development
of VDM models and their associated refinements. We compare the models and proof developed in this
way with the approaches taken in several other contemporary studies of the Mondex system.
1 Introduction
The work reported here was carried out as a contribution to the initial Grand Challenge 61 problem – that
of verifying the specification of an electronic purse system called Mondex. In [SCW00] the initial formal
development and verification of the system using the Z specification language was carried out, in which a
number of properties were verified. Some time after the original verification was carried out a number of
teams decided to redo the Mondex specification using a variety of methods and technologies, in order to
assess the current state of automated formal verification technology. This was as part of the Verification
Grand Challenge [WB07]. The work reported now was carried out some time after that initial effort using
the Vienna Development Method (VDM) in order to assess the level of maturity of verification and validation
support within VDM.
The Vienna Development Method (VDM) contains a set of validation techniques for modelling and
analysing systems including testing, animation and proof. This paper reports on our work and results using
each of these techniques.
The Mondex system provides a substitute for cash in which electronic cards store a balance as part of
their state and have the ability to take part in transactions by sending money to, and receiving money from,
other cards. The key properties of the Mondex system are:
• no money may be created, so a purse balance cannot increase without a decrease in another purse
balance, and
• all money must be accounted for within the system.
As in [SCW00], we developed two models of the system, an abstract and a concrete one. Both the
abstract models were developed in the object-oriented VDM++ dialect. A conversion of the models to the
(non object-oriented) VDM-SL dialect was performed in order to show refinement.
1http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/grand-challenge/index.cfm
1
The bulk of our effort in this task was consumed by the proof work which was undertaken. To show that
the concrete model is a valid implementation of the abstract one, a number of proof obligations must be
discharged. A retrieve function from concrete worlds to abstract ones is given, which must be shown to be
both total — every concrete world must be retrieved to an abstract one — and adequate — for any abstract
world, there is a corresponding concrete world such that applying the retrieve function to the concrete world
returns the abstract world. Further, the operations defined must be shown to respect the retrieve function.
We chose a representative operation and demonstrated for it that the retrieve function was respected. As a
learning exercise for (some of) those involved, all these proof obligations were discharged manually.
We developed tests to validate a number of properties for the abstract and concrete models. In this we
made use of the tool support provided for VDM, and so developing and executing these tests consumed much
less effort. The model was also animated, and a user-interface to the animation was developed.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the VDM validation technologies used. In
Section 3 and Section 4 we explain the abstract and concrete models, and in Section 5 we describe the
work carried out in testing and animating the model. Section 6 is a discussion of work involved in carrying
the proof task and Section 6.5 briefly describes the team and estimates the effort required for the various
tasks. Finally, Section 7 compares our work to other contemporary approaches and we draw conclusions in
Section 8. Specifications and proofs are given in Appendices A and I.
2 The Vienna Development Method
Our contribution to the Mondex challenge problem uses the formal specification language VDM [Jon90].
VDM is a mature model-based specification language that supports the construction of abstract system
models. The specifications in the Mondex case study are developed in the object-oriented dialect of the lan-
guage VDM++ [FLM+05]. VDM++ is supported by a well-established industry strength toolset VDMTools2
[FLS08], and more recently by the open source toolset, Overture3 [LFW+10]. To carry out the proofs, these
specifications are translated into the “flat” or non-object-oriented dialect, known as VDM-SL [Jon89].
2.1 Modelling and Analysis
A model in VDM++ is composed of a set of abstract class specifications. Each class defines a set of data
types, instance variables and operations. Data types are either simple types such as nat or bool, or abstract
collection types such as sets, sequences or records. Data types may be further constrained through predicate
expressions known as invariants. Operations update state variables and therefore describe the functionality of
a class. Operations may be defined implicitly, as pre- and postcondition pairs, or explicitly, using imperative
statements. Functions can be also be specified in a similar way to operations, but may not refer to state
variables.
2.1.1 Proof in VDM
VDM is built on well-established proof theory [BFL+94]. This allows us to reason about models written in
VDM. We use the VDM-SL dialect of VDM for generating and discharging the proof obligations (Section 6
discusses how VDM++ models are converted into VDM-SL models).
There are essentially two sets of proof obligations considered in this work: those that show the internal
consistency of a single model; and those that demonstrate the refinement relation between the abstract and
concrete models of the Mondex system.
An example of a proof obligation that demonstrates internal consistency of a model is that of satisfiability.
This requires, of an operation op, that for any input that satisfies pre-op (the precondition of the operation)
there must exist some state that satisfies post-op (the postcondition of the operation). In this work the
internal consistency proof obligations were generated and proved automatically (see Section 6.4).
2http://www.vdmtools.jp/en
3http://www.overturetool.org/
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2.1.2 Simulation using VDM models
The tools supporting VDM allow a user to exercise the executable parts of a model through an interpreter.
This permits validation that the required behaviour has been accurately captured in the model [FLM+05]. A
variety of testing and validation tools have been developed on this framework. In particular this study makes
use of the combinatorial testing feature [LL09] provided in Overture and an animation tool that provides a
GUI to the Mondex models [Cla09].
The combinatorial test feature in Overture automatically generates and conducts a large number of tests
on the model through the use of regular expressions (known as traces). A trace is sequence of one or more
operations with instantiated parameters. Each test can result in one of the following outcomes:
• Pass — The inputs are valid (the precondition of each operations holds at the time of execution) and
executing each operation over its inputs provides valid results (the operation postcondition holds).
None of the invariants are broken during the test.
• Inconclusive — The inputs of one of the operations are not valid (the precondition of that operation
does not hold).
• Fail — A runtime error occurs or the outputs of an operation are invalid for valid inputs (the operation
postcondition does not hold even though its precondition does).
As the combinatorial test feature of Overture executes the body of model operations to determine the
test outcome, implicitly defined operations are not supported. This extends to explicitly defined operations
which make operation calls to implicit operations.
VDMtools provides an interface to execute VDM from the Java programming language [FLM+05]. Using
this interface it is possible to program a GUI to a VDM model, allowing the model to be exercised in
interactive user-driven scenarios. Doing so enables easier validation by domain experts who may have little
knowledge of the formal notation used in the model. Both the combinatorial testing and the animation
carried out are discussed in Section 5.
2.2 Reification
An important aspect of many formal methods is refinement, the process of showing that a (more) concrete
specification respects an abstract one. In [Jon89] this is referred to as reification, and we use that term
here. This includes showing that more concrete data structures represent the same information as their
abstract equivalents, known as data reification. In VDM a retrieve function (often abbreviated to retr) is
used to map concrete data representations to their equivalent ones in the abstract model. For example the
retrieve function, whose signature is shown below, converts a concrete world (ConWorld) into an abstract
one (AbWorld).
retr :ConWorld → AbWorld
There are two properties that need to hold in order for the retrieve function to be correct. The function
must be total – it must map every concrete state to an abstract state, and adequate – every abstract state
must have a concrete representation.
More precisely, the totality proof obligation (called retr -form) requires that applying the retrieve function
to a given state in the concrete specification gives a valid state in the abstract specification. The retr -form
proof obligation is given below for concrete state ConWorld and abstract state AbWorld. mk -ConWorld is
a constructor for the concrete world, so mk-ConWorld(auth,cp) creates a concrete world instantiated with
the values auth and cp.
retr-form
mk -ConWorld(auth, cp):ConWorld
retr(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp)):AbWorld
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The adequacy proof obligation requires that for a given state in the abstract specification there exists
a corresponding state in the concrete specification (i.e. that there exists some concrete state c such that
retr(c) returns the abstract state). For ConWorld and AbWorld this is formalised as follows:
retr-adequate
a:AbWorld
∃c:ConWorld · retr(c) = a
Each operation in the concrete specification also needs to satsify a further two proof obligations. Firstly,
the domain proof obligation requires that the domain of the concrete operation is at least that of its ab-
stract equivalent. Secondly, the result proof obligation requires that the concrete operation cannot achieve
behaviour not permitted by its abstract equivalent. The retrieve function used in the Mondex case study,
and the resulting proof obligations, are explained in more detail in Section 6.3.
For this case study the reification proof obligations were discharged by hand using the VDM proof theory
rules found in [BFL+94].
3 Abstract Model
The Mondex system is a electronic purse system that hosts the purses on smart cards. Money may be trans-
ferred from one purse to another. It is a commercial development, but a commercially sanitised description
is given in [SCW00], in which the state of the cards in the system and the money transfer protocol are
modelled.
An abstract and a concrete model are developed, both modelled initially in VDM++. This section
describes the abstract model, in which money is transferred between purses in single, atomic, operations.
The model consists of an abstract purse and and abstract world, each of which are separate classes containing
related operations. The full abstract model is given in Appendix A.
3.1 Abstract Purse
The abstract purse in the VDM++ model is represented by the class AbPurse, which consists of two instance
variables, given in Figure 1. The variable balance stores the current balance of the purse, and lost stores the
total of any money that has been lost in failed transactions.
instance variables
private balance:N;
private lost :N;
Figure 1: Instance variables of the class AbPurse
Objects of this class do not transfer money to another purse directly (this ability is in the class AbWorld).
Instead they provide operations that allow these variables to be updated in a controlled way. These include
operations to increase and decrease the balance of the purse, used when transferring money from one purse
to another, and an operation to increase and decrease the value of the variable lost , used when transactions
fail.
Some of the operations have a precondition governing their execution. For example, the ReduceBalance
operation in Figure 2 has a precondition which ensures that it may only be executed if there are sufficient
funds in the purse.
The class also contains accessor operations which simply return the values of the instance variables.
These are used in the pre and postconditions of the money transfer operations in class AbWorld .
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ReduceBalance:N → ()
ReduceBalance(val) △ balance := balance − val
pre balance ≥ val ;
Figure 2: The ReduceBalance operation from the class AbPurse
3.2 Abstract World
The abstract world is the world in which the abstract purses exist. It contains all authentic purses. In
our abstract model the abstract world is represented by the class AbWorld, which contains a record (also
called AbWorld) given in Figure 3. A class invariant ensures that all of the purses in the abstract world are
authentic purses.
instance variables
private AbWorld :: authentic : PurseId -set
abPurses : PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse
inv mk -AbWorld(auth, pm) △ ∀name ∈ dom pm · name ∈ auth
Figure 3: Instance variables of the class AbWorld
AbWorld contains three operations: AbTransferOk, AbTransferLost and AbIgnore. Any purses involved
in any of these operations must be in the set of authentic purses, and this is ensured by preconditions for
each operation.
The AbIgnore operation does nothing, and has a postcondition that ensures that instance variables of
the class remain unchanged during the operation. The AbIgnore operation will be refined by any operations
in ConWorld which change only those variables introduced in ConWorld and consequently have no impact
on the abstract world.
AbTransferOk represents a successful transfer of money between two purses, where an amount is taken
from the balance of a from purse and added to the balance of a to purse. Certain security properties
(described in more detail in Section 5.1) are ensured by preconditions. A transfer can only occur if both
purses in the transaction are unique and authentic (security property 3), and if the from purse has sufficient
funds to complete the transaction (security property 4). The postcondition of the operation requires that
sum of the total (where total = balance + lost) of both purses is unchanged by the transaction as it was
before (security property 2.1), that the lost component of the to and from purses remains unchanged (since
this operation models a successful transfer), and that the balance and lost components of all other purses
not involved in the transaction remain unchanged (security property 1). The postcondition also requires
that no purses are added to the map of purses during the transaction.
The second of the transaction operations, AbTransferLost, models a failed transfer between two purses.
The amount which was intended to have been transferred will be removed from the balance variable of the
from purse and added to the lost variable of the from purse. This operation is again designed to respect the
desired security properties through pre and postconditions: for AbTransferOk to occur, both purses in the
transaction must be unique and authentic and sufficient funds must be present in the balance of the from
purse. After the operation the total (where total = balance + lost) of the from purse remains unchanged
and all other purses remain unchanged (including the to purse), and no purses are added to the set of purses
during the transaction.
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4 Concrete Model
The abstract world described in Section 3 above is just that — an ideal world where purses can instanta-
neously transfer sums of money between each other. While this allows examination of the problem, in the
real, concrete system, purses must communicate with each other in a realizable way, while maintaining the
security properties detailed in Section 5.1. The real Mondex system utilizes a message-passing protocol to
allow cards to transfer money. This section details our concrete model, which models concrete purses that
implement this message-passing protocol (as in [SCW00]). That this concrete model is a reification of the
abstract model is considered in this paper in Section 6. The full concrete model is given in Appendix B.
As with the abstract model detailed above, the concrete model contains a concrete purse and concrete
world. In addition, we have chosen to explicitly model the “ether” over which messages are passed, in order
to explore the notion of messages going missing or being compromised by hostile parties.
Note that, as in [SCW00], the concrete model is still an abstraction of the real system. We do not, for
example, model the encryption that protects messages that are transmitted over the ether. These details
are not included in the “sanitized” Mondex specification. The model does not include timeouts on messages
and assumes that the purses have unlimited memory. A second refinement to a cryptographically protected
system is present in [HSGR08].
4.1 Concrete Purse
The instance variables (state) of the concrete purse are given in Figure 4. They are: name (the purse’s
identity); balance (current balance); nextSeqNo (the sequence number to be used in the next transaction;
status (the purse’s current status); currTrans (the details of the current transaction); and exLog (exception
log recording failed transactions). As with the abstract purse, the concrete purse has various accessor
methods to retrieve the values of state components; and a constructor to create a purse.
instance variables
public name:ConWorld ‘PurseId ;
public balance:nat ;
public nextSeqNo:nat ;
public status:Status;
public currTrans: [TransDetails];
public exLog :TransDetails-set;
private ether : [Ether ];
Figure 4: Instance variables (state) of a ConPurse
The specification of the concrete purse is more complex than the abstract purse, since it models the
message-passing protocol upon which the card system operates. A number of new types are introduced in
order to model this protocol. It is therefore useful to describe the class with reference to the protocol itself.
If there is a problem within the message protocol, a purse can abort and record the failed transaction in
an exception log. This log performs the role of the abstract lost (which could be calculated as the sum of the
value of the exceptions within the exception log). In this current model, the circumstances under which the
purse aborts are not modelled, but these could include messages not being received (within a given time) or
the receipt of a repeated message (which could indicate a playback attack).
A definition of the Message type, showing the kinds of messages used in the protocol, is given in Figure 5.
A complete, successful transaction between two purses consists of five messages: StartFrom, StartTo, Req ,
Val , Ack . Recall that in a transaction there is the notion of a from purse (which is sending an amount of
money) and a to purse (which is receiving this money). The StartFrom and StartTo messages indicate that
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a transaction has been initiated. These messages carry details of the other purse involved in the transaction
(represented by the type CounterPartyDetails).
public Message = StartFrom | StartTo | <ReadExceptionLog> | Req | Val | Ack |
ExceptionLogResult | ExceptionLogClear | <Unprotected>;
Figure 5: Definition of the Message type, showing the various messages used for communication between
ConPurses
The to purse then sends a Req message requesting the value be transferred. In response, the from
purse sends a Val message (which is the point at which the money is transferred). The to purse must then
acknowledge receipt of the money with an Ack message. These messages are represented by the union type
Message in the concrete purse definition. Each of the Req , Val , Ack messages carry details of the current
transaction using the type TransDetails (see below).
There are four other types of messages represented by the Message type (again, see Figure 5). These
are: <ReadExceptionLog> (representing a request to read the exception log); ExceptionLogResult (the
result of reading the exception log); ExceptionLogClear (representing a request to clear the exception log);
and <Unprotected> (representing a message that is unencrypted and which therefore cannot be relied
upon to be genuine).
The purse class handles those messages which invoke actions of the purse with the RecMsg operation,
which uses a case statement to in turn invoke an operations corresponding to each message. For example,
StartFromOkay responds to StartFrom messages, OpReq handles Req messages and so on.
In order to ensure that the messages sent and received by purses are both genuine and not repeated (as
they would be in a replay attack), a sequence number from each purse is given to each transaction (hence
two sequence numbers are recorded for each transaction).
The details of a transaction are recorded with the TransDetails (transaction details) type, which com-
prises: the identity of the two purses, the sequence number from both purses; and the value of the transaction.
A definition for this type is given in Figure 6. This type forms the content of the Req , Val and Ack messages.
The purse records the details of the current transaction in order to check that any messages received are
genuine.
publicTransDetails :: fromPurse : Conworld ‘PurseId
toPurse : Conworld ‘PurseId
fromSeqNo : nat
toSeqNo : nat
val : nat
Figure 6: Definition of the TransDetails type, which records information about a transaction
In addition, each purse tracks its position within the protocol with a status. This information is captured
in the union type Status, presented in Figure 7. The four statuses are: <Idle> (the purse may begin
a transaction); <EPR> (the purse is expecting a Req message); <EPV> (the purse is expecting a Val
message); <EPA> (the purse is expecting an Ack message).
private Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA>;
Figure 7: Definition of the Status type, representing the status of a ConPurse
The purse should not respond to a message that is is not expecting (as this would break the protocol and
may break the security properties). For example, the purse should not process a Val message if its state is not
<EPV>, the purse should not begin a transaction if it is not <Idle>, and so on. The various restrictions
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detailed above are captured using preconditions on the message-handling operations. A partial definition
for the StartFromOkay operation (showing the precondition) is given in Figure 8. This precondition ensures
the following:
• that the purse is not entering a transaction with itself
• that the purse has a sufficient balance to make the transaction
• that the purse is in the <Idle> state (ready for a transaction)
• that the purse knows about the ether (see Section 4.3).
StartFromOkay :CounterPartyDetails → B
StartFromOkay(cpd) △
. . .
pre cpd .name 6= name ∧ cpd .val ≤ balance ∧ status = <Idle> ∧ ether 6= nil ;
Figure 8: Pre-condition for the StartFromOkay operation of ConPurse
The precondition for StartToOkay is the same, except it doesn’t need to check the balance. The OpReq ,
OpVal and OpAck operations ensure that the purse is in the correct state to receive the message and that
the message is part of the current transaction (i.e. that the transaction details of the message match those
held by the purse). The exception log operations require that the purse is <Idle>.
The concrete purse can also perform four “invisible” operations (those which don’t result in messages
being sent). These are: Increase (increase the sequence number); Abort (abort the current transaction);
LogIfNecessary (adds the current transaction to the exception log if the purse aborted during a crucial step);
Image (an underspecified operation responsible for ensuring that the exception log isn’t cleared without first
being read).
4.2 Concrete World
The ConWorld class is simpler than the AbWorld class, since much of the detail of the concrete model is
handled within the ConPurse class. The instance variables of ConWorld are given in Figure 9. As with
abstract world however, the concrete world contains a map from purse identities to purses and a set of
authentic purse identities. In addition, the world contains an ether, which models how messages are sent
between purses and is detailed below.
instance variables
private conauth:PurseId -set;
private conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse := { };
private ether :Ether ;
private previousmessages:ConPurse‘TransDetails-set;
inv ∀name ∈ dom conpurses · name ∈ conauth;
Figure 9: Instance variables of the class ConWorld
The class has a constructor, accessor functions and a single transaction operation, ConTransfer , that
initiates a transaction between two purses (this can be used for testing and animation, see Section 5).
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4.3 Ether
In [SCW00], messages at the concrete level are considered to travel across the “ether”. All messages are
considered to be sufficiently protected when traveling through the ether (e.g. through encryption). Our use
of VDM however allows us to explicitly model this ether and explore how the model is affected when the
ether is compromised.
We model this with an abstract Ether class. The main operation is SendMsg , which transmits a message
to a purse. Each concrete purse contains an instance of an Ether class and uses this operation to send all
messages through. The Ether class also contains four operations to allow the world to inject messages into
the ether: StartFrom, StartTo, ExceptionLogClear , ReadExceptionLog . These messages are not generated
by purses, rather they are generated in response to some external input. They are useful for testing and
animation of the model.
Subclasses of Ether should then implement these five operations. We initially defined a PerfectEther
class, which always delivers all messages successfully. We also created various subclasses of Ether that drop
certain messages, in order to test the protocol. This is explored in Section 5.1. It would also be possible to
create Ether classes that generated malicious messages, or replayed previous messages, to further test the
protocol.
5 Testing and Animation
5.1 Testing
The Overture Integrated Development Environment (IDE) allows a user to create, syntax and type check
models and use an interpreter to explore their behaviour. One aspect of Overture is a combinatorial testing
feature which allows for automated high-volume testing of VDM++ models through the use of regular
expressions, known as traces. Traces are an extension to the VDM++ language [LL09]. A trace consists
of a let expression defining a variable list and a sequence of model operations. The combinatorial testing
view within Overture reports the results of a test trace using the result categories in Section 2.1.2 (Pass,
Inconclusive and Fail), together with any output generated by the sequence of model operations in the test
trace.
Determining the test coverage obtained through combinatorial testing is not currently available in the
Overture tool, and bespoke testing scripts must be used if test coverage data is required. Measuring test
coverage is a planned feature for a future release of the tool [LFW+10]. Testing of VDM++ models in
VDMTools4 is supported by coverage analysis tools, which have been successfully deployed in a number of
industrial applications [FL06].
In the remainder of this section we discuss the combinatorial testing used to verify the security properties
below. We address the test traces used to verify these properties in both the concrete and abstract models.
This required the definition of new classes for the VDM++ versions of the abstract and concrete models:
AbTest and ConTest . These classes include the instance variables, values and traces required for the tests
performed and are given in full in Appendix C and Appendix D.
Security Properties
We consider the security properties defined in [SCW00]. Below, we provide a brief explanation of these
properties and identify the models within which each one is checked.
Security Property 1: No value creation This property requires that no value may be created within
the Mondex system. In other words, the sum of the balances of all purses must not increase. The
property is checked within both models.
4Downloads are available via http://www.vdmtools.jp/en/
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Security Property 2.1: All value accounted all value must be accounted for in the system. This prop-
erty stipulates that the sum of all purses’ balances and lost components does not change. This property
is checked within the abstract model.
Security Property 2.2: Exception logging This property is a slight variation on SP2.1 relating to the
concrete model only. Within the concrete purse the lost component is replaced with an exception log.
If a purse aborts a transfer where value may be lost, then the transaction details of that transfer must
be logged.
Security Property 3: Authentic purses This property states that a transfer can occur only between
purses deemed authentic. It applies to both abstract and concrete models.
Security Property 4: Sufficient funds The property requires that a transaction may only occur if there
are sufficient funds in the balance of the from purse. This property applies to both models.
SP1: No Value Creation
The no value creation security property stipulates that no value may be created in the system. That is, the
total balances of the abstract purses must not increase after any transfer operations. To aid in testing we
modified the AbWorld class by adding an auxiliary operation, TotalWorldBalance, to determine the total
amount in all purse balances. An example test trace from the AbTest class is shown in Figure 10. The trace
performs three transfer operations, checking the world balance before and after these operations.
AbTestSP1:
let x = abworldSP1 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 5} in
(
x .TotalWorldBalance();
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
x .TotalWorldBalance()
)
Figure 10: Extract from AbTest class, depicting trace for SP1
The test trace produces a total of 162 tests, all of which pass — demonstrating that no pre- or post-
conditions were violated. We manually check the results of each test, comparing the returned value of the
TotalWorldBalance before and after the 3 transfer operations. The postconditions of the transfer operations
ensure the SP1 security property holds, and so the fact that all tests pass is a good indication that the
abstract model conforms to SP1.
We take the same approach for the concrete model, though do not provide the details here. The full test
class for the concrete model is included in Appendix D for reference.
SP2: All Value Accounted
The second security property, all value accounted, differs slightly between the abstract and concrete model.
In the abstract world, SP2.1 ensures that the total value in the balance and lost fields of all purses remains
the same after any transfer operation. In the concrete world, however, SP2.2 states that if a purse aborts
transfer at a point in which value could be lost, then the transfer details are logged.
In the abstract model, we use the same testing tactic as SP1. A different auxiliary operation, TotalWorldValue,
is used to determine the total value in the world in the manual check of test results. Due to the similarities
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Ether
From To
bal lost bal lost
req – – – +n
val -n +n – +n
ack -n +n +n –
Table 1: Results of SP2 test showing how relation between the point at which messages are dropped and the
change in purse balance and lost variables (for a transaction of value n)
with SP1, we do not include the details of this test trace here, however the tests developed for the concrete
model do raise some interesting differences.
To perform the tests for the concrete model, we first created three new faulty ether classes to model
messages being dropped at each stage of the message exchange protocol. The FaultyEtherReq , FaultyEtherVal
and FaultyEtherAck ether classes drop request, value and acknowledgement messages respectively. Message
dropping is handled by invoking the abort operation of both purses in a transaction upon the ether instance
receiving the relevant message. We also modified the ConWorld constructor parameter list to include a
character indicating the ether class to use in purse transactions.
The test trace ConTestSP2, given in Figure 11, uses one of three worlds; conworldSP2ack , conworldSP2req
or conworldSP2val . These test worlds contain purses with the same contents, only the ether instance used
in each case differs.
instance variables
public conworldSP2ack :ConWorld := newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP2af , . . .}, ‘a’);
public conworldSP2req :ConWorld := newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP2bf , . . .}, ‘r’);
public conworldSP2val :ConWorld := newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP2cf , . . .}, ‘v’);
public conworldsSP2:ConWorld -set := {conworldSP2ack , conworldSP2req , conworldSP2val};
traces
ConTestSP2:
let x ∈ conworldsSP2 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 5} in
(
x .GetPurseBalLost(fid);
x .GetPurseBalLost(tid);
x .ConTransfer(fid , tid ,n);
x .GetPurseBalLost(fid);
x .GetPurseBalLost(tid)
)
Figure 11: Extract of ConTest class with instance variables and trace for SP2
The test trace results in 18 tests, all of which pass. The test trace includes a call to an accessor operation,
GetPurseBalLost , in order to investigate the contents of the from and to purses. Table 1 below summarises
the changes in the balance and exception logs of the purses involved in the transaction. The term lost denotes
the total value of logged transactions in a purse’s exception log. The resultant behaviour exhibited in the
test trace conforms to the security property SP2.2. Purses update their log if the purse is in the <EPV>
or <EPA> state — that is if the to purse is expecting a value message or the from purse is expecting an
acknowledgement.
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SP3: Authentic Purses
The third security property, authentic purses, requires that transfers are only valid between those purses
deemed authentic. Two test traces were added for the purposes of testing this property, and some additional
purse identifiers added to the value list of the test class. A stronger property was also tested that denies
transfers between authentic purse identifiers which are not linked to purse objects. In Figure 12, an extract
of AbTest is given, detailing the relevant constructs for SP3.
AbTestSP3:
let x = abworldSP3 in
let n = 5 in
let f = fid in
let t ∈ {tid , undef 1, undef 2, undef 3, undef 4} in
(
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n))
)
AbTestSP3b:
let x = abworldSP3 in
let n = 5 in
let t = tid in
let f ∈ {fid , undef 1, undef 2, undef 3, undef 4} in
(
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n))
)
Figure 12: AbTest class extract containing test trace for SP3
AbTestSP3a attempts to transfer a set amount (5 units) from an authentic purse to a range of purse
identifiers: fid , an authentic purse and one present in the abPurses domain; undef 1 and undef 2, authentic
purse identifiers that do not map to purse objects; and undef 3 and undef 4, which are not authentic purse
identifiers. AbTestSP3b attempts to transfer from this range of purses to an authentic purse.
The two test traces result in 80 test cases. Of these tests, the transfers between authentic purses respect
the pre- and postconditions of the relevant operations and thus the test cases yield pass results. Those tests
cases between authentic purses not mapped to purse objects, and non-authentic purse identifiers result in
inconclusive results due to the precondition failure of the relevant transfer operation.
As with SP1, the tests are similar on the concrete world, and so are not given in this section.
SP4 : Sufficient Funds
The final security property, Sufficient Funds, dictates that the purse from which funds are transferred has
sufficient funds in their balance. A simple boundary test trace for this property is required for both abstract
and concrete worlds. The AbTest extract given in Figure 13 details the trace AbTestSP4 transfers between
0 and 10 units from a purse containing only 5 units using both TransferOK and TransferLost operations.
The ABTestSP4 trace results in 22 test cases. Of these test cases, 11 passed — those for which the amount
being transferred was less than or equal to the starting balance of the from purse. Those transactions with the
value being transferred greater than the purse balance, returned inconclusive due to precondition violation
of either the TransferOk or TransferLost operations.
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AbTestSP4
let x = abworldSP4 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 10}
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n))
Figure 13: AbTest class extract containing test trace for SP4
The test trace for the concrete world follows the same approach and is given in Appendix D.
5.2 Animation
VDMTools permits the control of the interpreter via an API that may be accessed through an application-
specific GUI. This allows domain experts unfamiliar with the underlying formal notation an opportunity
to exercise the model directly, rather than using code derived from the model. We refer to this as an
animation-based approach to model validation. Such an approach was followed by Clarke in her animation
of the concrete VDM++ model of Mondex developed in this paper [Cla09].
The animation uses an architecture based on the model-view-controller pattern used in the Dynamic
Coalitions Workbench [FBG+08], which allows users to experiment with models of alternative information
flow policies in a dynamically changing group of communicating agents.
Clarke’s Mondex GUI allows execution of user scenarios based on the operations modelling parts of a
transaction, including abnormal behaviour, such as attempting to transfer funds to the same purse they
came from, and modelling of a range of faults. Although validation of the model succeeded using this GUI,
it is worth noting Clarke’s observation that reporting user-friendly information on the causes of a failed
transaction necessitated embedding information about the meaning of preconditions into the interface, thus
coupling the interface more tightly to the content of the model than might have been desirable.
6 Proof
A formal theory for reasoning about VDM models is provided in [BFL+94]. The axioms and inference rules
of the theory refer to the VDM-SL dialect of VDM. We therefore begin, in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, by showing
how we model the domain and operations of the object-oriented model in the VDM-SL dialect. The full
VDM-SL model is given in Appendix E. Given VDM-SL models of the abstract and concrete worlds, and
formal theory of VDM-SL, in Section 6.3 we present the retrieve function and describe the proof effort. In
Section 6.4 we describe our results in the automation of the proof task and in Section 6.5 we record some
observations on the modelling and proving exercise.
6.1 Domain Modelling
The object-oriented classes AbWorld and AbPurse are combined into a single VDM-SL module abworld .
The AbPurse class becomes a record in abworld (Figure 14), with the private instance variables balance and
lost as fields of the record.
publicAbPurse :: balance : N
lost : N
Figure 14: Definition of the AbPurse record.
The state of the abworld module is derived from the state of the AbWorld class presented in Section 3.2.
Each instance variable in AbWorld (authentic and abPurses) has a corresponding state variable (abauth and
abpurses). The type of abauth is the same as the type of authentic, and the type of abpurses is a map
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from PurseId (which remains of type token) to records of type AbPurse. The state invariant is a logically
equivalent translation from the class invariant, and the state initially contains no purses or purse identifiers.
state AbWorld of
abauth:PurseId -set
abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse
inv mk AbWorld(abauth, abpurses) △ dom abpurses ⊆ abauth
Figure 15: The state of AbWorld in the VDM-SL model
The concrete model contains separate classes representing the world, purse and ether. As with in the
abstract model, the state of the flattened conworld module is derived from the state of the ConWorld class.
The instance variables of the ConWorld class becomes the state of the conworld module, and purses become
records within that module. The concept of the ether is not translated into the VDM-SL model. The
operations in the conworld module directly control the transfer of funds.
6.2 Operation Modelling
The AbWorld operations are translated into operations within the abworld module, and the operations in
ConWorld are translated into the module conworld . Pre- and postconditions are given for all operations, as
well as the operational definition.
In conworld , a successful run is modelled by the operation ConTransferOk . The other four operations
represent failures of the protocol at different points, and are constructed as an initial sequence of the protocol
operations (OpReq , OpVal , OpAck) followed by an Abort operation on each of the communicating purses.
After this sequence, some resolution of the state of the purses is necessary to ensure that they are returned to
a consistent state. This resolution represents the action of the bank. In most cases, the resolution required
is to simply remove from the exception logs the transaction details that would be removed by the bank.
In one case (ConTransferLostValSucceed) the presence of the transaction details in the purse exception log
represents a genuine loss of money, which would be credited by the bank and must therefore be part of the
resolution of the operation.
In the case of ConTransferOK , the three low-level protocol operations OpReq , OpVal and OpAck occur
in sequence. Neither purse needs to abort, and no resolution is necessary. The full definition of the concrete
operation ConTransferOK is given in Fig. 16. The precondition requires that the identifiers of the from and
to purses be different, that they are both valid identifiers, and that the amount to be transferred is available
in the from purse. We refer the reader to Appendix E for the definitions of the remaining operations.
ConTransferLostReq models the loss of the req message. The protocol therefore fails before completion
of OpReq . The transaction details of the receiving purse are logged. The from purse begins in status
<EPR>, so the LogIfNecessary operation is not executed. This operation refines AbIgnore. Some resolution
is necessary here because the receiving purse logs the transaction details, and for the constructed operation
to model AbIgnore, these details must be removed from the transaction log of the receiving purse.
The case where the protocol fails because the req message is lost is non-deterministic, and is mod-
elled by two operations at the concrete level. In each case OpReq completes, but OpVal does not. The
non-determinism arises because we cannot tell whether the sum to be transferred has been placed in the
receiving purse. The case where the sum has not yet been added to the receiving purse is modelled by
ConTransferLostValFail , and the case where the sum has been added to the receiving purse is modelled by
ConTransferLostValSucceed . In the first case, the value is removed from the sending purse, and the trans-
action details are logged. The receiving purse will log the transaction details, and so the resolution removes
these, and ConTransferLostValFail refines AbTransferLost . Both purses log the transaction details in the
operation ConTransferLostValSucceed , so in the resolution we must remove both of these. We also add the
transferred sum to the receiving purse.
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ConTransferOk : (PurseId ,PurseId ,N)→ ()
ConTransferOk(fid , tid , val) △
let fseqno = conpurses(fid).seqno,
tseqno = conpurses(tid).seqno,
td = mk TransDetails(fid , tid , fseqno, tseqno, val) in
(
StartFromOkay(fid ,mk CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , tseqno));
StartToOkay(tid ,mk CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , fseqno));
OpReq(fid , td);
OpVal(tid , td);
OpAck(fid , td)
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ {dom conpurses} ∧
tid ∈ {dom conpurses} ∧
conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(conpurses(fid)) + total(conpurses(tid)) =
total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid)) + total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid)) ∧
conpurses(fid).bal + conpurses(tid).bal <=↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).bal +↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).bal ∧
conpurses(fid).seqno >=↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
conpurses(tid).seqno >=↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(fid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).exlog ∧
conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom ↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
↼−−−−−
conauth = conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ {dom conpurses \ {fid , tid}} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid)
Figure 16: The ConTransferOK operation
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The loss of the acknowledgement message is modelled by the top-level operation ConTransferLostAck . In
this case, from the point of view of the receiving purse the protocol has terminated correctly, and so no resolu-
tion is necessary. The sending purse logs the transaction details when it fails to receive the acknowledgement
message, and so these must be removed in the resolution.
6.3 The Retrieve Function and Formal Proof
To show that the concrete development in VDM-SL is a valid implementation of the abstract specification, we
formally define the relationship between them. This relationship is given by the retrieve function (Figure 17).
The retrieve function is a function from the concrete world to the abstract world which returns, for any
concrete world, the abstract world of which it is an implementation.
retr :ConWorld → AbWorld
retr(mk ConWorld(cauth, cp)) △
mk AbWorld(cauth, pid 7→ mk AbPurse(cp(pid).bal , sumval(cp(pid).exlog)) | pid ∈ {dom cp})
Figure 17: The retrieve function
This definition uses the function sumval , which maps a set of transaction details in the concrete imple-
mentation of a purse to the sum of their values in the abstract implementation. It is defined recursively
as
sumval-defn
s:TD-set
sumval(s) = if s = { } then 0 else let x ∈ s in x .val + sumval(s \ {x})
Figure 18: The sumval function
A retrieve function gives rise to a number of proof obligations, all of which need to be discharged if we are
to assert that the concrete world is a valid implementation of the abstract one. The first proof obligation to
discharge is that of totality, which states that every possible concrete world must be retrieved to an abstract
one. In other words, all concrete worlds must have an abstract representation. The totality proof rule for
the retrieve function above is also called the formation rule. It is given in Figure 19. The name of the rule
is retr -form. The antecedent of the rule is given above the line, and the consequent below. The constructor
mk -ConWorld() creates a new ConWorld using the set of authorised purse identities (auth), and a mapping
from identities to members of ConPurses (cp).
retr-form
mk -ConWorld(auth, cp):ConWorld
retr(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp)):AbWorld
Figure 19: The totality proof obligation
The proofs were carried out using the natural deduction style, and the full proof of the totality obligation
is given in Figure 20. At each step, the deduction arrived at is recorded. The rule that was applied is recorded
on the right hand side, and the parameters indicate the line or lines in the proof that justify applying this
rule. The hypotheses of the rule are labelled implicitly, with hx standing for hypothesis x . The full set of
rules that were used is recorded in Appendix F.
The second proof obligation to discharge is that of adequacy : the retrieve function must ensure that all
abstract worlds have a concrete representation, or that for any abstract world a, there is a corresponding
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from mk -ConWorld(auth, cp):ConWorld
1 inv -ConWorld(auth, cp) inv -ConWorld -I(h1)
2 dom cp ⊆ auth unfolding(1)
3 mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
4 mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses = cp conpurses-defn(h1)
5 cp:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse =-type-inherit-right(3,4)
6 dom cp:PurseId -set dom-form(5)
7 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom cp
7.1 name ∈ dommk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses =-subs-left(b)(5,4,7.h2)
7.2 mk -AbPurse(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses(name).exlog):AbPurse
ConWorld -AbWorld -form(7.h1,h1,7.2)
infer mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog):AbPurse =-subs-right(a)(3,4,7.2)
8 auth:PurseId -set ConWorld -1-form(h1)
9 {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp}:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse map-comp-form-left-set(6,7)
10 dom {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp} = dom cp dom-defn-map-comp-left-set(6,7)
11 dom {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp} ⊆ auth =-subs-left(b)(6,10,2)
12 inv -AbWorld(auth,
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp}) folding(11)
13 mk -AbWorld(auth,
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp}):AbWorld mk -AbWorld -form(8,9,12)
infer retr(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp)):AbWorld folding(13)
Figure 20: The proof of the totality obligation
concrete world c such that retr(c) = a. The adequacy obligation is given in Figure 21 and is discharged in
Appendix G.2.
retr-adequate
a:AbWorld
∃c:ConWorld · retr(c) = a
Figure 21: The adequacy proof obligation
The adequacy and totality proof rules deal with the abstract and concrete states, and provide assurance
that the retrieve function connects these states appropriately. The concrete world contains operations which
correspond to the operations in the abstract world and the remaining obligations deal with linking the
dynamic behaviour of the model in the abstract and the concrete states. They fall into two sets, and are
known as domain obligations and result obligations, and together they show that a concrete operation is a
valid implementation of an abstract operation.
The domain obligations show that the domains of aop and cop are properly linked by the retrieve function.
This can be restated as follows: if a state in the concrete world is linked by the retrieve function to a state
in the abstract world which is in the domain of aop (the precondition of aop holds), then the concrete state
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must be in the domain of the corresponding concrete operation cop (the precondition of cop must hold in the
concrete state). This is known as the domain obligation for operation aop. Formally, with pre-op defined as
the precondition of an operation op:
∀c· ∈ ConWorld · pre-aop(retr(c)) ⇒ pre-cop(c)
The result obligations concern the postconditions of operations. For any operation op and pair of states
↼−s and s, let the postcondition of the operation be given by a function post-op(↼−s , s), which evaluates to
true when op(↼−s ) results in the state s. The result proof obligation requires that if two concrete states c and
↼−c are linked by a concrete operation cop, (i.e. post-cop(↼−c , c) holds), and the precondition of the related
abstract operation aop holds in the state retr(↼−c ), then it must be the case that the postcondition of aop
holds over the retrieved states retr(↼−c ) and retr(c). We write:
∀↼−c , c ∈ ConWorld · pre-aop(retr(↼−c )) ∧ post-cop(↼−c , c) ⇒ post-aop(retr(↼−r , retr(r))
Due to limits of time, we considered only the concrete operation ConTransferLostValFail . This models
one possible outcome of the abstract operation AbTransferLost under the retrieve function. The domain
obligation for these operations is given in Figure 22 and is discharged in Appendix H.1.1.
TransferLost-dom
c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val) ⇒ pre-ConTransferLostValFail(c,fid , tid , val)
Figure 22: The domain obligation for TransferLost
The result obligation for the TransferLost operations is given in Figure 23. It is discharged in H.1.2.
TransferLost-res
c:ConWorld ;↼−c :ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N
pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val); post-ConTransferLostValFail(c,↼−c ,fid , tid , val)
post-AbTransferLost(retr(c), retr(↼−c ),fid , tid , val)
Figure 23: The result obligation for TransferLost
A number of useful results were formulated and proved as lemmas throughout the course of this work.
These included lemmas about the retrieve function such as dom-purses-=, which states that the purses used
in a concrete world have the same identifiers when the corresponding abstract world was generated by the
retrieve function. The rule and its proof are given in Appendix H.1.1.
Certain results about the subsidiary function sumval (Figure 6.3) were also proved. These included well-
formedness, and a proof that sumval applied to a set containing details of exactly one transaction {a} was the
value a.val of that transaction. The proofs of the well-formedness property can be found in Appendix G.2,
and the proof the result of its application to a singleton set in Appendix G.3.
6.4 Automation
The work of Sander Vermolen [Ver07] gave us the option of using HOL4 [SN08] to automatically verify the
consistency of the abstract VDM++ model, by showing that the model discharges all of its proof obligations.
Vermolen developed a VDM++ to HOL a translation tool that translates functional VDM++ models into
semantically equivalent HOL models, as well as translating the proof obligations generated from the VDM++
model. The proof obligations can then be automatically discharged using the HOL4 proof tool.
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Using the translation tool, a functional version of the abstract VDM++ model was translated into a HOL
model. The proof obligations for the model were generated by VDMTools and then translated to terms in
the HOL logic. The model and the proof obligations were then passed to the HOL4 proof tool. To assist the
proof process, we also used a set of custom tactics that were written specifically for models that had been
translated from VDM++.
HOL was able to find proofs for all of the proof obligations of the abstract model without any problems.
At the time the translator did not translate operations, and so only the abstract model was considered in
this way.
6.5 Remarks
Some remarks about the team carrying out the work reported here are in order. The team comprised of six
core members. One had significant previous experience in theorem proving. The other five had no or very
little experience in theorem proving, although all were familiar with VDM specifications.
Each identified proof obligation was assigned to a member of the team. Completed proofs were checked
by two other members of the team. We estimate that the work of developing and checking the proofs was
about 3 person months in total.
Many proofs were straightforward, though often long and verbose, commonly due to typing judgements
and equality rules. As a consequence, due to the fact line numbers are managed manually, considerable
effort was taken up with such ‘clerical’ aspects. Whilst those proofs may be more easily discharged by
automated proof tools and are often self-evident, we felt that it was important to be rigorous in our proofs.
The individually numbered lines and arguments appealing to unique inference rules aids in the readability
of natural deduction proofs. The checks only identified minor details such as missing justifications for the
application of a proof rule. One of the most difficult proofs was the adequacy of the retrieve function. This
was as much a matter of unwieldy definitions as inherent complexity. It was clear what the “target” was (a
concrete world that retrieved to the hypothesised abstract one), but the proof itself required showing that
several properties of the target concrete world held, and the linear format of the proof style meant that this
rapidly became difficult to manage. In these cases the checking role became one of assisting with the proof.
The testing work required about 2 person-days in total, including time to achieve sufficient familiarity
with the testing tool.
7 Related Work
In [FW08], Freitas and Woodcock explore the costs and benefits of using the Z/Eves theorem prover to
mechanise the handwritten proofs found in the original Mondex monograph. The original Z specification
of Mondex was changed as little as possible (and a prover that existed at the time was also used for the
automation) to allow reflection on the effort that would have been required to include automated proof in
the original project. However, some problems were discovered in the original specification, so changes were
required to amend these. For example some finiteness assumptions were only informally made and a number
of properties were omitted, thus allowing the possibility of inauthentic purses being created or manipulated.
Freitas and Woodcock conclude with some insight into the cost of automating the proof: the whole project
(covering approx. 90% of the proof effort) took eight man weeks to complete over six months; automated
proof could have been included in the original research for just 10% extra effort.
In [BY08], Butler and Yadav present a development of the Mondex system in Event-B which uses the
B4Free [Cle09] and Click’n’Prove [AC03] tools. Event-B promotes an incremental approach in which a series
of intermediate models are developed and the refinement relations between these models are specified using
gluing invariants. This incremental approach leads to a high degree of automatic proof. This is in contrast to
our experience, where proofs were carried out by hand. The Event-B style of modelling is quite different from
Z, and so Butler and Yadav treated [SCW00] as a requirements document, and (for example) redeveloped
the invariants rather than use the ones given in [SCW00]. They capture the full behaviour of the protocol.
They estimate that the development took two weeks of effort spread over several months. The bulk of this
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work was in developing the Event-B models and constructing invariants between them, and over 97% of
the proof obligations arising from the development were proved automatically. It is interesting to note that
much of the manual proof required in [BY08] involved the sum function, that returns the total of a finite set
of transactions. Much of our proof effort was also expended on proofs that involved our equivalent function,
sumval.
In [HSGR08], Haneberg et al. describe a verification of the Mondex system using the KIV interactive
theorem prover and ASMs (Abstract State Machines). The paper contains two main results. The first is
a full verification of the original Mondex protocol (refinement between the abstract and concrete worlds).
In the translation of the Z specification to KIV, the team discovered small errors and inconsistencies in
the original development and proofs. They also formulated a single-step refinement between the abstract
and concrete worlds (as opposed to the two-step refinement in [SCW00]). This is similar to our result.
Estimated effort for the initial proofs of the protocol was one person month. In addition to verification
of the original protocol, the paper describes a further refinement to a protocol that includes cryptography.
As noted in Section 4, both the original verification and the other approaches presented here assume that
messages are secure. In another paper, the group also describes an implementation of the Mondex system
using JavaCard [GMB+06].
In [KG08], Kuhlman and Gogolla describe a model of the Mondex system in UML (Universal Modelling
Language). They describe both an imperative and declarative approach. OCL (Object Constraint Language)
was used to describe constraints on the abstract world in terms of invariants and pre- and postconditions.
The USE (UML Specification Environment) tool was used to check a series of test cases (both positive
and negative). Their development only considers the abstract world (partially because there is no notion
of formal refinement in UML). Therefore, they do not achieve similar verification results as other papers
described above. They claim however that their development could be understood by a prospective client
without a formal background.
In [GH07], the authors develop a stepwise refinement of the Mondex specification using the RAISE formal
specification language RSL. The RAISE language permits a wide family of specification styles. The approach
taken was in keeping with the RAISE method of refinement between specification levels, and closely followed
the Z approach. Three levels were described, with the purpose in each being to contribute to the definition
of the protocol operations. In the first level a definition of correctness is given for each operation, in the
second the behaviour is specified axiomatically, and in the final level the operations are explicitly defined.
Each specification level was translated to both the PVS theorem prover and the SAL model checker. With
PVS, the consistency conditions at each level and the relations between levels generated a number of proof
obligations. In some cases tactics were developed to deal with simple recurring patterns, and others were
individually proved by experts. Interestingly, one of the most difficult cases involved the logs of transactions,
here the difficulty arose in the proof that the logs were finite. The RSL to SAL translator was experimental,
and only the middle level was translated. In this way some simple liveness properties were established,
although the Mondex specification was limited to a small number of purses and possible transactions to
reduce state space.
In [Ram07], the author checks a specification of Mondex developed the Alloy method. The Alloy method
includes a modelling language based on first-order logic and the Alloy Analyzer tool, based on model-finding
through SAT solving. The specification is translated into an SAT formula so that discovering an instance
of the formula corresponds to finding a counter-example of the theorem being checked. The Alloy language
is significantly different from the Z of the original specification, and the analyzer itself is limited in certain
ways, for example, in not having a full representation of integers. It was possible to compensate for this
however, because not all of the properties of integers were needed each time they were used, and so integers
were replaced in each case by representations that retained the properties necessary and which were encoded
more efficiently in Alloy.
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8 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a development of the Mondex electronic purse system using VDM. The task
was undertaken by a small group with a range of previous experience with formal modelling and VDM in
particular. We successfully captured the Mondex problem in VDM and were able to explore and verify the
resulting specifications using automated testing, animation and formal proof. The formal proofs make use
of a single-step refinement, as achieved by other contemporary groups.
The model-based approach of VDM, and in particular the object-orientation of VDM++, intuitively
capture the notion of a system of cards, where each individual card is represented by a single object. We
would also argue that, although some features such as long preconditions can look overwhelming, overall the
specifications in VDM are more readable than, for example, the original specification in Z [SCW00].
One of the clear strengths of choosing VDM is the robust set of tools available, which supported the
construction of our specifications and made automated testing and animation possible. The rapid improve-
ment of the open-source Overture tool in recent years, including the introduction of new features such as
the combinatorial testing capabilities, has only helped in this regard. Overture has become an excellent
addition to the tools available to the VDM user, complementing the industrial-strength, commercial tool set
VDMTools.
An obvious downside of the use of VDM++ is the necessity to convert the specification into VDM-SL in
order to perform formal proofs. The lack of a proof theory for the newer dialects of VDM has been identified
by members of the VDM and Overture community as a key issue for the future direction of VDM. At a
workshop in 2010, the community undertook to investigate this issue in the coming years [PPe10].
In addition to the restriction to VDM-SL, there is also a lack of tool support for proof in VDM. Although
the mural tool developed in the early 1990s was perhaps ahead of its time [JJLM91], it is now all but
lost. While some automated proof was achieved in our development [Ver07], the vast majority of the proof
work was done by hand. This was a laborious process, however it was not a futile one. It proved to be
an excellent learning experience for those involved, though perhaps not one they will wish to repeat soon.
Having discussing our feelings after the proof work was completed, we felt that tool support could really help,
however we didn’t necessarily want to lose the option of producing hand-crafted proofs, since the process
offers great insight into the studied problem and proof work in general.
Much of the tedium of hand-producing these proofs in the natural deduction style lies in the numbering
of lines and justifications, and the requirement to manually update these as proofs evolve. Thus even a
simple tool which aided in typesetting natural deduction proofs, which offered features such as automated
line-numbering, would be of great help. At the next level of complexity, a proof checker would greatly reduce
the human effort in checking proofs. In our process, each proof was painstakingly checked by hand at least
twice, thus three separate people spent significant time on each proof.
Going further, a suite offering support for semi-automated, user-guided proof would begin to match
the level of tool support for various other formal approaches. This was the key offering of the mural
tool [JJLM91] and thus a resurrection or re-imagining of the mural tactic language / engine would be a
great addition to a suite of tools. Finally, the ability to discharge large numbers of proofs automatically
would bring tool-supported proof in VDM up to the level offered by other contemporary approaches, such
as Rodin [Rod08]. The necessity to show adequacy however —which involves finding a witness value for
an existential qualification— means that some user input will likely always be required. There is however
ongoing research that may be able to help in this area, such as the AI4FM project [GJ10]. A tool that
offered all of these features would be an excellent counterpart and counterpoint to the open-source Overture
initiative.
It should be noted however that issues with formal proof (the current restriction to VDM-SL and lack
of tool support for proofs) has not stopped the use of VDM in industry, suggesting that the well-supported
techniques of specification, automated testing and animation are more important in the industrial domain.
However there is a clear opportunity to improve what has been a somewhat neglected strength of VDM,
with the current tools understandably focussing on the needs of industry for simulation, automated testing
an animation.
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A Abstract Model
A.1 AbPurse
class AbPurse
instance variables
private balance:N;
private lost :N;
operations
public GetBalance: ()→ N
GetBalance() △
(
returnbalance
);
public IncreaseBalance:N → ()
IncreaseBalance(val) △
(
balance := balance + val
);
public ReduceBalance:N → ()
ReduceBalance(val) △
(
balance := balance − val
)
pre balance ≥ val ;
public GetLost : ()→ N
GetLost() △
(
returnlost
);
public IncreaseLost :N → ()
IncreaseLost(val) △
(
lost := lost + val
);
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public GetTotal : ()→ N
GetTotal() △
(
returnbalance + lost
);
public AbPurse:N× N → AbPurse
AbPurse(bal , lst) △
(
balance := bal ;
lost := lst
)
end AbPurse
A.2 AbWorld
class AbWorld
types
public PurseId = token;
instance variables
private abauth:PurseId -set;
private abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse := { };
inv ∀name ∈ dom abpurses · name ∈ abauth;
operations
public AbIgnore: ()→ ()
AbIgnore() △
skip
post abauth =
↼−−−−
abauth ∧
abpurses =
↼−−−−−
abpurses;
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public AbTransferOk :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
AbTransferOk(fid , tid , val) △
(
abpurses(fid).ReduceBalance(val);
abpurses(tid).IncreaseBalance(val)
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
abpurses(fid).GetBalance() ≥ val
post abpurses(fid).GetTotal() + abpurses(tid).GetTotal() =
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).GetTotal() +
↼−−−−−
abpurses(tid).GetTotal() ∧
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).GetBalance() +
↼−−−−−
abpurses(tid).GetBalance() ≥
abpurses(fid).GetBalance() + abpurses(tid).GetBalance() ∧
∀name ∈ dom abpurses \ fid , tid ·
↼−−−−−
abpurses(name).GetBalance() = abpurses(name).GetBalance() ∧
↼−−−−−
abpurses(name).GetLost() = abpurses(name).GetLost() ∧
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).GetLost() = abpurses(fid).GetLost() ∧
↼−−−−−
abpurses(tid).GetLost() = abpurses(tid).GetLost() ∧
dom
↼−−−−−
abpurses = dom abpurses ∧
↼−−−−
abauth = abauth;
public AbTransferLost :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
AbTransferLost(fid , tid , val) △
(
abpurses(fid).ReduceBalance(val);
abpurses(fid).IncreaseLost(val)
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
abpurses(fid).GetBalance() ≥ val
post abpurses(fid).GetTotal() =
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).GetTotal() ∧
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).GetBalance() ≥ abpurses(fid).GetBalance() ∧
∀name ∈ (dom abpurses) \ fid ·
↼−−−−−
abpurses(name).GetBalance() = abpurses(name).GetBalance() ∧
↼−−−−−
abpurses(name).GetLost() = abpurses(name).GetLost() ∧
dom
↼−−−−−
abpurses = dom abpurses ∧
↼−−−−
abauth = abauth;
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public AbWorld :PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse × PurseId -set→ AbWorld
AbWorld(purses, auth) △
(
abpurses := purses;
abauth := auth
)
pre dom purses ⊂ auth
end AbWorld
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B Concrete Model
B.1 ConPurse
class ConPurse
types
private Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA>;
public TransDetails :: fromPurse : ConWorld ‘PurseId
toPurse : ConWorld ‘PurseId
fromSeqNo : N
toSeqNo : N
val : N
public CounterPartyDetails :: name : ConWorld ‘PurseId
val : N
seqNo : N
public Message = StartFrom | StartTo | <ReadExceptionLog> | Req | Val | Ack
| ExceptionLogResult | ExceptionLogClear | <Unprotected>;
public StartFrom = CounterPartyDetails;
public StartTo = CounterPartyDetails;
public Req = TransDetails;
public Val = TransDetails;
public Ack = TransDetails;
public ExceptionLogResult :: name : ConWorld ‘PurseId
td : TransDetails
public ExceptionLogClear :: name : ConWorld ‘PurseId
clear : token
instance variables
private name:ConWorld ‘PurseId ;
private balance:N;
private nextSeqNo:N;
private status:Status;
private currTrans:
[
TransDetails
]
;
private exLog :TransDetails-set;
private ether :
[
Ether
]
;
operations
private Increase: ()→ ()
Increase() △
let delta ∈ {1, ..., 10} in
nextSeqNo := nextSeqNo + delta;
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private Abort : ()→ ()
Abort() △
(
self .LogIfNecessary();
status := <Idle>;
self .Increase()
);
private LogIfNecessary : ()→ ()
LogIfNecessary() △
if status = <EPV> ∨ status = <EPA>
then exLog := exLog ∪ {currTrans}
pre currTrans 6= nil;
private Image(tds:TransDetails-set)c: token
pre true
post true;
public RecMsg :Message → ()
RecMsg(m) △
cases m of
mk -StartFrom(cpd)→ StartFromOkay(cpd)
mk -StartTo(cpd)→ StartToOkay(cpd)
<ReadExceptionLog>→ (Abort();ReadExceptionLog())
mk -Req(td)→ OpReq(td)
mk -Val(td)→ OpVal(td)
mk -Ack(td)→ OpAck(td)
mk -ExceptionLogClear(nm, clear)→ (Abort();ClearExceptionLog(nm, clear))
others skip
end
private StartFromOkay :CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartFromOkay(cpd) △
(
currTrans := mk -TransDetails(name, cpd .name,nextSeqNo, cpd .seqNo, cpd .val);
status := <EPR>;
self .Increase();
ether .SendMsg(<Unprotected>)
)
pre cpd .name 6= name ∧ cpd .val ≤ balance ∧ status = <Idle> ∧ ether 6= nil;
private StartToOkay :CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartToOkay(cpd) △
(
currTrans := mk -TransDetails(cpd .name,name, cpd .seqNo,nextSeqNo, cpd .val);
status := <EPV>;
self .Increase();
ether .SendMsg(mk -Req(currTrans))
)
pre cpd .name 6= name ∧ status = <Idle> ∧ ether 6= nil;
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private OpReq :TransDetails → ()
OpReq(td) △
(
balance := balance − td .val ;
status := <EPA>;
ether .SendMsg(mk -Val(td))
)
pre status = <EPR> ∧ currTrans = td ∧ ether 6= nil;
private OpVal :TransDetails → ()
OpVal(td) △
(
balance := balance + td .val ;
status := <Idle>;
ether .SendMsg(mk -Ack(td))
)
pre status = <EPV> ∧ currTrans = td ∧ ether 6= nil;
private OpAck :TransDetails → ()
OpAck(td) △
(
status := <Idle>;
ether .SendMsg(<Unprotected>)
)
pre status = <EPA> ∧ currTrans = td ∧ ether 6= nil;
private ReadExceptionLog : ()→ ()
ReadExceptionLog() △
(
if exLog =
then ether .SendMsg(<Unprotected>)
else let logtd ∈ exLog in
ether .SendMsg(mk -ExceptionLogResult(name, logtd))
)
pre status = <Idle> ∧ ether 6= nil;
private ClearExceptionLog :ConWorld ‘PurseId × token → ()
ClearExceptionLog(nm, c) △
(
exLog := { };
ether .SendMsg(<Unprotected>)
)
pre exLog 6= { } ∧ status = <Idle> ∧ nm = name ∧ c = Image(exLog) ∧ ether 6= nil;
public GetBalance: ()→ N
GetBalance() △
return balance;
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public GetLost : ()→ N
GetLost() △
(
dcl lost :N := 0;
for all
td ∈ exLog do lost := lost + td .val ;
return lost
);
public GetTotal : ()→ N
GetTotal() △
return self .GetBalance() + self .GetLost();
public GetSeqNo: ()→ N
GetSeqNo() △
return nextSeqNo;
public SetEther :Ether → ()
SetEther(ethr) △
ether := ethr ;
public ConPurse:ConWorld ‘PurseId × N → ConPurse
ConPurse(nm, bal) △
(
name := nm;
balance := bal ;
status := <Idle>;
nextSeqNo := 0;
currTrans := nil;
exLog := { };
ether := nil;
);
end ConPurse
B.2 ConWorld
class ConWorld
types
public PurseId = token
instance variables
private conauth:PurseId -set;
private conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse := { };
private ether :Ether ;
private previousmessages:ConPurse‘TransDetails-set;
inv ∀name ∈ dom conpurses · name ∈ conauth;
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operations
public ConTransfer :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
ConTransfer(fid , tid , val) △
(
let p1seqNo = conpurses(fid).GetSeqNo(), p2seqNo = conpurses(tid).GetSeqNo() in
(
ether .StartFrom(fid ,mk -ConPurse‘CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , p2seqNo));
ether .StartTo(tid ,mk -ConPurse‘CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , p1seqNo));
)
)
pre fid ∈ dom conpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom conpurses;
public GetPurse:PurseId → ConPurse
GetPurse(name) △
return conpurses(name)
pre name ∈ dom conpurses;
public GetConPurses: ()→ PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse
GetConPurses() △
return conpurses;
public ConWorld :PurseId -set→ ConWorld
ConWorld(names) △
(
ether := new PerfectEther(self );
conauth := names;
conpurses := name 7→ new ConPurse(name, 100) | name ∈ names;
for all purse ∈ rng conpurses do
purse.SetEther(ether);
previousmessages := { };
);
end ConWorld
B.3 Ether
class Ether
instance variables
protected world :ConWorld ;
operations
public StartFrom:ConWorld ‘PurseId × ConPurse‘CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartFrom(pid , cpd) △
is subclass responsibility;
public StartTo:ConWorld ‘PurseId × ConPurse‘CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartTo(pid , cpd) △
is subclass responsibility;
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public ExceptionLogClear :ConWorld ‘PurseId × token → ()
ExceptionLogClear(pid , clear) △
is subclass responsibility;
public ReadExceptionLog :ConWorld ‘PurseId → ()
ReadExceptionLog(pid) △
is subclass responsibility;
public SendMsg :ConPurse‘Message → ()
SendMsg(m) △
is subclass responsibility;
public Ether :ConWorld → Ether
Ether(w) △
world := w ;
end Ether
B.4 Perfect Ether
class PerfectEther is subclass of Ether
operations
public StartFrom:ConWorld ‘PurseId × ConPurse‘CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartFrom(name, cpd) △
world .GetPurse(name).RecMsg(mk -ConPurse‘StartFrom(cpd));
public StartTo:ConWorld ‘PurseId × ConPurse‘CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartTo(name, cpd) △
world .GetPurse(name).RecMsg(mk -ConPurse‘StartTo(cpd));
public ExceptionLogClear :ConWorld ‘PurseId × token → ()
ExceptionLogClear(name, clear) △
world .GetPurse(name).RecMsg(mk -ConPurse‘ExceptionLogClear(name, clear));
public ReadExceptionLog :ConWorld ‘PurseId → ()
ReadExceptionLog(name) △
world .GetPurse(name).RecMsg(<ReadExceptionLog>);
public SendMsg :ConPurse‘Message → ()
SendMsg(m) △
cases m of
mk -ConPurse‘Req(td)→ world .GetPurse(td .fromPurse).RecMsg(m)
mk -ConPurse‘Val(td)→ world .GetPurse(td .toPurse).RecMsg(m)
mk -ConPurse‘Ack(td)→ world .GetPurse(td .fromPurse).RecMsg(m)
mk -ConPurse‘ExceptionLogResult(-, -)→ skip
<Unprotected>→ skip
others skip
end
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public PerfectEther :ConWorld → PerfectEther
PerfectEther(w) △
world := w ;
end PerfectEther
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C Abstract World Test Class
class AbTest
instance variables
public abworldSP1:AbWorld :=
new AbWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ abpurseSP1f , tid 7→ abpurseSP1t});
public abworldSP2:AbWorld :=
newAbWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ abpurseSP2f , tid 7→ abpurseSP2t});
public abworldSP3:AbWorld :=
newAbWorld({fid , tid , undef 1, undef 2}, {fid 7→ abpurseSP3f , tid 7→ abpurseSP3t});
public abworldSP4:AbWorld :=
newAbWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ abpurseSP4f , tid 7→ abpurseSP4t})
values
fid = mk -token(P1);
tid = mk -token(P2);
undef 1 = mk -token(undef1);
undef 2 = mk -token(undef2);
undef 3 = mk -token(undef3);
undef 4 = mk -token(undef4);
abpurseSP1f :AbPurse = newAbPurse(50, 0);
abpurseSP1t :AbPurse = newAbPurse(75, 0);
abpurseSP2f :AbPurse = newAbPurse(50, 0);
abpurseSP2t :AbPurse = newAbPurse(75, 0);
abpurseSP3f :AbPurse = newAbPurse(50, 0);
abpurseSP3t :AbPurse = newAbPurse(75, 0);
abpurseSP4f :AbPurse = newAbPurse(5, 0);
abpurseSP4t :AbPurse = newAbPurse(10, 0)
traces
AbTestSP1:
let x = abworldSP1 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 5} in
(
x .TotalWorldBalance();
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
x .TotalWorldBalance()
);
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AbTestSP2:
let x = abworldSP2 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 5} in
(
x .TotalWorldValue();
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbIgnore());
x .TotalWorldValue()
);
AbTestSP3a:
let x = abworldSP3 in
let n = 5 in
let f = fid in
let t ∈ {tid , undef 1, undef 2, undef 3, undef 4} in
(
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n))
);
AbTestSP3b:
let x = abworldSP3 in
let n = 5 in
let t = tid in
let f ∈ {fid , undef 1, undef 2, undef 3, undef 4} in
(
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n));
(x .AbTransferOk(f , t ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(f , t ,n))
);
AbTestSP4:
let x = abworldSP4 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 10} in
(x .AbTransferOk(fid , tid ,n) | x .AbTransferLost(fid , tid ,n))
end AbTest
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D Concrete World Test Class
class ConTest
instance variables
public conworldSP1:ConWorld :=
newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP1f , tid 7→ conpurseSP1t}, ‘p’);
public conworldSP2ack :ConWorld :=
newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP2af , tid 7→ conpurseSP2at}, ‘a’);
public conworldSP2req :ConWorld :=
newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP2bf , tid 7→ conpurseSP2bt}, ‘r’);
public conworldSP2val :ConWorld :=
newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP2cf , tid 7→ conpurseSP2ct}, ‘v’);
public conworldsSP2:ConWorld -set :=
{conworldSP2ack , conworldSP2req , conworldSP2val};
public conworldSP3:ConWorld :=
newConWorld({fid , tid , undef 1, undef 2}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP3f , tid 7→ conpurseSP3t}, ‘p’);
public conworldSP4:ConWorld :=
newConWorld({fid , tid}, {fid 7→ conpurseSP4f , tid 7→ conpurseSP4t}, ‘p’);
values
fid = mk token(CP1);
tid = mk token(CP2);
undef 1 = mk token(undef1);
undef 2 = mk token(undef2);
undef 3 = mk token(undef3);
undef 4 = mk token(undef4);
conpurseSP1f :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP1), 50);
conpurseSP1t :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP2), 100);
conpurseSP2af :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP1), 50);
conpurseSP2at :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP2), 100);
conpurseSP2bf :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP1), 50);
conpurseSP2bt :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP2), 100);
conpurseSP2cf :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP1), 50);
conpurseSP2ct :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP2), 100);
conpurseSP3f :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP1), 50);
conpurseSP3t :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP2), 100);
conpurseSP4f :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP1), 50);
conpurseSP4t :ConPurse = newConPurse(mk token(CP2), 100);
37
traces
ConTestSP1:
let x = conworldSP1 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 5} in
(
x .TotalWorldBalance();
x .ConTransfer(tid ,fid ,n);
x .TotalWorldBalance();
x .GetPurseBalLost(fid);
x .GetPurseBalLost(tid)
)
ConTestSP2:
let x ∈ conworldsSP2 in
let n ∈ {0, ..., 5} in
(
x .GetPurseBalLost(fid);
x .GetPurseBalLost(tid);
x .ConTransfer(fid , tid ,n);
x .GetPurseBalLost(fid);
x .GetPurseBalLost(tid)
)
ConTestSP3a:
let x = conworldSP3 in
let n = 5 in
let f = fid in
let t ∈ {tid , undef 1, undef 2, undef 3, undef 4} in
x .ConTransfer(t , f ,n)
ConTestSP3b:
let x = conworldSP3 in
let n = 5 in
let t = tid in
let f ∈ {fid , undef 1, undef 2, undef 3, undef 4} in
x .ConTransfer(t , f ,n)
ConTestSP4:
let x = conworldSP4 in
let n ∈ {45, ..., 55} in
x .ConTransfer(fid , tid ,n)
end ConTest
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E VDM-SL Model
E.1 abworld
module abworld
definitions
types
PurseId = token;
AbPurse :: bal : N
lost : N;
state AbWorld of
abauth:PurseId -set
abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse
inv mk -AbWorld(abauth, abpurses) △ dom abpurses ⊂ abauth
init a △ a = mk -AbWorld({ }, {7→})
end
operations
AbIgnore: ()→ ()
AbIgnore() △
skip
post abauth =
↼−−−−
abauth ∧
abpurses =
↼−−−−−
abpurses;
AbTransferOk :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
AbTransferOk(fid , tid , val) △
(
abpurses(fid).bal := abpurses(fid).bal − val ;
abpurses(tid).bal := abpurses(tid).bal + val
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(abpurses(fid)) + total(abpurses(tid)) = total(
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid)) + total(
↼−−−−−
abpurses(tid)) ∧
abpurses(fid).bal + abpurses(tid).bal ≤
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).bal +
↼−−−−−
abpurses(tid).bal ∧
abpurses(fid).lost =
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).lost ∧
abpurses(tid).lost =
↼−−−−−
abpurses(tid).lost ∧
dom abpurses = dom
↼−−−−−
abpurses ∧
abauth =
↼−−−−
abauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom abpurses \ {fid , tid} · abpurses(pid) =
↼−−−−−
abpurses(pid);
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AbTransferLost :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
AbTransferLost(fid , tid , val) △
(
abpurses(fid).bal := abpurses(fid).bal − val ;
abpurses(fid).lost := abpurses(fid).lost + val ;
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom abpurses ∧
abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(abpurses(fid)) = total(
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid)) ∧
abpurses(fid).bal ≤
↼−−−−−
abpurses(fid).bal ∧
dom
↼−−−−−
abpurses = dom abpurses ∧
abauth =
↼−−−−
abauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom abpurses \ {fid} · abpurses(pid) =
↼−−−−−
abpurses(pid)
functions
total :AbPurse → Ntotal(mk -AbPurse(bal , lost)) △ bal + lost ;
end abworld
E.2 conworld
module conworld
definitions
types
PurseId = token;
ConPurse :: bal : N
seqno : N
status : Status
ctrans :
[
TransDetails
]
exlog : TransDetails-set;
Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA>;
TransDetails :: fid : PurseId
tid : PurseId
fseqno : N
tseqno : N
val : N;
CounterPartyDetails :: pid : PurseId
val : N
seqno : N;
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state ConWorld of
conauth:PurseId -set
conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse
inv mk -AbWorld(conauth, conpurses) △ dom conpurses ⊂ conauth
init c △ c = mk -ConWorld({ }, {7→})
end
operations
ConTransferOk :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
ConTransferOk(fid , tid , val) △
let fseqno = conpurses(fid).seqno,
tseqno = conpurses(tid).seqno,
td = mk -TransDetails(fid , tid , fseqno, tseqno, val) in
(
StartFromOkay(fid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , tseqno));
StartToOkay(tid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , fseqno));
OpReq(fid , td);
OpVal(tid , td);
OpAck(fid , td)
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(conpurses(fid)) + total(conpurses(tid)) = total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid)) + total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid)) ∧
conpurses(fid).bal + conpurses(tid).bal ≤↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).bal +↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).bal ∧
conpurses(fid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
conpurses(tid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(fid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).exlog ∧
conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
↼−−−−−
conauth = conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {fid , tid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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ConTransferLostReq :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
ConTransferLostReq(fid , tid , val) △
let fseqno = conpurses(fid).seqno,
tseqno = conpurses(tid).seqno,
td = mk -TransDetails(fid , tid , fseqno, tseqno, val) in
(
StartFromOkay(fid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , tseqno));
StartToOkay(tid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , fseqno));
Abort(fid);
Abort(tid);
conpurses(td .tid).exlog := conpurses(td .tid).exlog \ {td}
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post conpurses(fid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).bal ∧
conpurses(tid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).bal ∧
conpurses(fid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
conpurses(tid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(fid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).exlog ∧
conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ fid , tid · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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ConTransferLostValFail :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
ConTransferLostValFail(fid , tid , val) △
let fseqno = conpurses(fid).seqno,
tseqno = conpurses(tid).seqno,
td = mk -TransDetails(fid , tid , fseqno, tseqno, val) in
(
StartFromOkay(fid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , tseqno));
StartToOkay(tid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , fseqno));
OpReq(fid , td);
Abort(fid);
Abort(tid);
conpurses(td .tid).exlog := conpurses(td .tid).exlog \ td
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(conpurses(fid)) = total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid)) ∧ conpurses(fid).bal ≤↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).bal ∧
conpurses(tid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).bal ∧
conpurses(fid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
conpurses(tid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(fid).exlog conpurses(fid).ctrans =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).exlog ∧
conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {fid , tid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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ConTransferLostValSucceed :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
ConTransferLostValSucceed(fid , tid , val) △
let fseqno = conpurses(fid).seqno,
tseqno = conpurses(tid).seqno,
td = mk -TransDetails(fid , tid , fseqno, tseqno, val) in
(
StartFromOkay(fid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , tseqno));
StartToOkay(tid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , fseqno));
OpReq(fid , td);
Abort(fid);
Abort(tid);
conpurses(td .fid).exlog := conpurses(td .fid).exlog \ {td};
conpurses(td .tid).exlog := conpurses(td .tid).exlog \ {td};
conpurses(td .tid).bal := conpurses(td .tid).bal + td .val
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(conpurses(fid)) + total(conpurses(tid)) = total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid)) + total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid)) ∧
conpurses(fid).bal + conpurses(tid).bal ≤↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).bal +↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).bal ∧
conpurses(fid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
conpurses(tid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(fid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).exlog ∧
conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
↼−−−−−
conauth = conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {fid , tid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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ConTransferLostAck :PurseId × PurseId × N → ()
ConTransferLostAck(fid , tid , val) △
let fseqno = conpurses(fid).seqno,
tseqno = conpurses(tid).seqno,
td = mk -TransDetails(fid , tid , fseqno, tseqno, val) in
(
StartFromOkay(fid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(tid , val , tseqno));
StartToOkay(tid ,mk -CounterPartyDetails(fid , val , fseqno));
OpReq(fid , td);
OpVal(tid , td);
Abort(fid);
Abort(tid);
conpurses(td .fid).exlog := conpurses(td .fid).exlog \ {td}
)
pre fid 6= tid ∧
fid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
tid ∈ dom conpurses ∧
conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val
post total(conpurses(fid)) + total(conpurses(tid)) = total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid)) + total(↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid)) ∧
conpurses(fid).bal + conpurses(tid).bal ≤↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).bal +↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).bal ∧
conpurses(fid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
conpurses(tid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(fid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(fid).exlog ∧
conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {fid , tid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
Increase:PurseId → ()
Increase(pid) △
let δ ∈ {1, . . . , 10} in
conpurses(pid).seqno := conpurses(pid).seqno + δ
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).status ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).ctrans ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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LogIfNecessary :PurseId → ()
LogIfNecessary(pid) △
if conpurses(pid).status = <EPV> ∨ conpurses(pid).status = <EPA>
then conpurses(pid).exlog := conpurses(pid).exlog ∪ {conpurses(pid).ctrans}
pre conpurses(pid).ctrans 6= nil
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).status ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).ctrans ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog \ {conpurses(pid).ctrans} =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
Abort :PurseId → ()
Abort(pid) △
(
LogIfNecessary(pid);
conpurses(pid).status := <Idle>;
Increase(pid)
)
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog conpurses(pid).ctrans =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
StartFromOkay :PurseId × CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartFromOkay(pid , cpd) △
(
conpurses(pid).ctrans := mk -TransDetails(pid , cpd .pid , conpurses(pid).seqno, cpd .seqno, cpd .val);
conpurses(pid).status := <EPR>;
Increase(pid)
)
pre cpd .pid 6= pid ∧
cpd .val ≤ conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <Idle>
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <EPR> ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans = mk -TransDetails(pid , cpd .pid , conpurses(pid).seqno, cpd .seqno, cpd .val) ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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StartToOkay :PurseId × CounterPartyDetails → ()
StartToOkay(pid , cpd) △
(
conpurses(pid).ctrans := mk -TransDetails(cpd .pid , pid , cpd .seqno, conpurses(pid).seqno, cpd .val);
conpurses(pid).status := <EPV>;
Increase(pid)
)
pre cpd .pid 6= pid ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <Idle>
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <EPV> ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans = mk -TransDetails(pid , cpd .pid , conpurses(pid).seqno, cpd .seqno, cpd .val) ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
OpReq :PurseId × TransDetails → ()
OpReq(pid , td) △
(
conpurses(pid).bal := conpurses(pid).bal -td .val ;
conpurses(pid).status := <EPA>
)
pre conpurses(pid).status = <EPR> ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans = td
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal − td .val ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <EPA> ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans = td ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
OpVal :PurseId × TransDetails → ()
OpVal(pid , td) △
(
conpurses(pid).bal := conpurses(pid).bal + td .val ;
conpurses(pid).status := <Idle>
)
pre conpurses(pid).status = <EPV> ∧ conpurses(pid).ctrans = td
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal + td .val ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans = td ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
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OpAck :PurseId × TransDetails → ()
OpAck(pid , td) △
(
conpurses(pid).status := <Idle>;
)
pre conpurses(pid).status = <EPA> ∧
conpurses(pid).ctrans = td
post conpurses(pid).bal =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).bal ∧
conpurses(pid).seqno ≥↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).seqno ∧
conpurses(pid).status = <Idle> ∧
conpurses(pid).exlog =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid).exlog ∧
dom conpurses = dom↼−−−−−−conpurses ∧
conauth =
↼−−−−−
conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ dom conpurses \ {pid} · conpurses(pid) =↼−−−−−−conpurses(pid);
functions
total :ConPurse → N
total(mk -ConPurse(bal , -, -, -, exlog)) △
bal + sumval(exlog);
sumval :TransDetails-set→ N
sumval(s) △
if s = { } then 0 else let x ∈ s ∈ x .val + sumval(s \ {x});
end conworld
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F Rules Derived from Models
AbWorld rules
mk-AbWorld-form
a:PurseId -set
p:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse
inv -AbWorld(a, p)
mk -AbWorld(a, p):AbWorld
inv-AbWorld-form
mk -AbWorld(a, p):AbWorld
inv -AbWorld(a, p)
mk-AbWorld-defn
a:AbWorld
mk -AbWorld(a.abauth, a.abpurses) = a
mk-AbPurse-form
b:N; l :N
mk -AbPurse(b, l):AbPurse
mk-AbPurse-defn
a:AbPurse
mk -AbPurse(a.bal , a.lost) = a
AbPurse-bal-form
a:AbPurse
a.bal :N
AbPurse-lost-form
a:AbPurse
a.lost :N
AbPurse-bal-defn
mk -AbPurse(b, l):AbPurse
mk -AbPurse(b, l).bal = b
AbPurse-lost-defn
mk -AbPurse(b, l):AbPurse
mk -AbPurse(b, l).lost = l
abpurses-form
a:AbWorld
a.abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse
abpurses-defn
mk -AbWorld(a, p):AbWorld
mk -AbWorld(a, p).abpurses = p
TD-form
n1:PurseId ;n2:PurseId
fsq :N; tsq :N; val :N
mk -TD(n1,n2, fsq , tsq , val):TD
abauth-form
a:AbWorld
a.abauth:PurseId -set
abauth-defn
mk -AbWorld(a, p):AbWorld
mk -AbWorld(a, p).abauth = a
=-mk-AbPurse
x :N; y :N; x = a; y = b
mk -AbPurse(x , y) = mk -AbPurse(a, b)
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=-AbWorld
a:AbWorld
b:AbWorld
a.abauth = b.abauth
a.abpurses = b.abpurses
a = b
ConWorld rules
mk-ConWorld-form
a: abworld ‘PurseId -set
p: abworld ‘PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse
inv -ConWorld(a, p)
mk -ConPurse(a, p):ConWorld
inv-ConWorld-I
mk -ConWorld(a, p):ConWorld
inv -ConWorld(a, p)
conauth-defn
mk -ConWorld(a, p):ConWorld
mk -ConWorld(a, p).conauth = a
conauth-form
mk -ConWorld(a, p):ConWorld
mk -ConWorld(a, p).conauth: abworld ‘PurseId -set
conpurses-defn
mk -ConWorld(a, p):ConWorld
mk -ConWorld(a, p).conpurses = p
conpurses-form
mk -ConWorld(a, p):ConWorld
mk -ConWorld(a, p).conpurses: abworld ‘PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse
mk-ConPurse-form
x :PurseId
n1:N
n2:N
s:Status
ex :TD-set
mk -ConPurse(x ,n1,n2, s,nil , ex ,nil):ConPurse
ConPurse-exlog-form
cp:ConPurse
cp.exlog :TD-set
ConPurse-exlog-defn
mk -ConPurse( , , , , , ex , ):ConPurse
mk -ConPurse( , , , , , ex , ).exlog = ex
ConPurse-bal-form
cp:ConPurse
cp.bal :N
ConPurse-bal-defn
mk -ConPurse( , v , , , , , ):ConPurse
mk -ConPurse( , v , , , , , ).bal = v
< Idle >-form
<Idle>:<Idle>
Status-form
Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA>
bal-form
mk -ConPurse(b, -, -, -, -)
b:N
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Other rules used
dom-form
m:A
m
−→ B
domm:A-set
Quote-type-extend
T = <A> | B ; e:<A>
e:T
retr-defn
c:ConWorld
retr(c) = mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses)})
sumval-defn
s:TD-set
sumval(s) = if s = { } then 0 else let x ∈ s in x .val + sumval(s \ {x})
total-C-form
p:ConPurse
totalC (p):N
totalC-defn
purse:ConPurse
totalC (purse) = purse.bal + sumval(purse.exlog)
totalA-defn
purse:AbPurse
totalA(purse) = purse.bal + purse.lost
{a,b}-form
a:A; b:A
{a, b}:A-set
{a,b}-defn
a:A; b:A
{a, b} = add(a, add(b, {}))
∀-elem-I
a:A;P(a); s:A-Set ;∀b ∈ s \ {a} · P(b)
∀b ∈ s · P(b)
TD-val-form
t :TD
t .val :N
TD-val-defn
mk -TD( , , , , v):TD
mk -TD( , , , , v).val = v
let-defn1
a:A
let x ∈ {a} in P(x ) = P(a)
let-∈- form
a:A;P(a):B
(let x ∈ {a} in P(x )):B
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G Data Reification Proofs
G.1 Formation of the retrieve function
Conjecture
retr-form
mk -ConWorld(auth, cp):ConWorld
retr(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp)):AbWorld
Proof
from mk -ConWorld(auth, cp):ConWorld
1 inv -ConWorld(auth, cp) inv -ConWorld -I(h1)
2 dom cp ⊆ auth unfolding(1)
3 mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
4 mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses = cp conpurses-defn(h1)
5 cp:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse =-type-inherit-right(3,4)
6 dom cp:PurseId -set dom-form(5)
7 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom cp
7.1 name ∈ dommk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses =-subs-left(b)(5,4,7.h2)
7.2 mk -AbPurse(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp).conpurses(name).exlog):AbPurse
ConWorld -AbWorld -form(7.h1,h1,7.2)
infer mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog):AbPurse =-subs-right(a)(3,4,7.2)
8 auth:PurseId -set ConWorld -1-form(h1)
9 {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp}:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse map-comp-form-left-set(6,7)
10 dom {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp} = dom cp dom-defn-map-comp-left-set(6,7)
11 dom {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp} ⊆ auth =-subs-left(b)(6,10,2)
12 inv -AbWorld(auth,
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp}) folding(11)
13 mk -AbWorld(auth,
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(cp(name).bal , sumval(cp(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom cp}):AbWorld mk -AbWorld -form(8,9,12)
infer retr(mk -ConWorld(auth, cp)):AbWorld folding(13)
G.2 Adequacy of the retrieve function
Conjecture
retr-adequate
a:AbWorld
∃c:ConWorld · retr(c) = a
Proof
x = mk -ConWorld(a.abauth, {name 7→ mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
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{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) | name ∈ dom a.abpurses})
from a:AbWorld
1 x :ConWorld con-assign(h1)
2 x .conauth:PurseId -set conauth-form(1)
3 x .conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(1)
4 dom x .conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(3)
5 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom x .conpurses
5.1 x .conpurses(name):ConPurse at-form(5.h1, 3, 5.h2)
5.2 x .conpurses(name).bal :N ConPurse-bal-form(5.1)
5.3 x .conpurses(name).exlog :TD-set ConPurse-exlog-form(5.1)
5.4 sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog):N sumval-form(5.3)
infer mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)):AbPurse mk-AbPurse-form(5.2, 5.4)
6 {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse map-comp-form-left-set(4, 5)
7 inv -ConWorld(x .conauth, x .conpurses) inv-ConWorld-I(1)
8 dom x .conpurses ⊆ x .conauth unfolding(7)
9 dom {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses} = dom x .conpurses dom-defn-map-comp-left-set(4, 5)
10 dom {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}:PurseId dom-form(6)
11 dom {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses} ⊆ x .conauth =-subs-left(a)(10, 9, 8)
12 inv -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}) folding(11)
13 mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}):AbWorld mk-AbWorld-form(2, 6, 12)
14 x .conauth = a.abauth conauth-defn(1)
15 a.abauth:PurseId -set abauth-form(h1)
16 mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}).abauth = x .conauth abauth-defn(13)
17 mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}).abauth = a.abauth =-trans(b)(2, 16, 14)
18 a.abauth = mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}.abauth =-symm(b)(15, 17)
19 a.abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(h1)
20 dom a.abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(19)
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from a:AbWorld
. . .
21 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom a.abpurses
21.1 a.abpurses(name):AbPurse at-form(21.h1, 19, 21.h2)
21.2 a.abpurses(name).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(21.1)
21.3 a.abpurses(name).lost :N AbPurse-lost-form(21.1)
21.4 0:N 0-form
21.5 <Idle>:<Idle> <Idle>-form
21.6 Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA> Status-form
21.7 <Idle>:Status Quote-type-extend(21.6, 21.5)
21.8 mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0,
a.abpurses(name).lost):TD TD-form(21.h1, 21.h1, 21.4, 21.4, 21.3)
21.9 {mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)}:TD-set {a}-form(21.8)
infer mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil):ConPurse
mk-ConPurse-form(21.h1, 21.2, 21.4, 21.7, 21.9)
22 dom {name 7→
mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) |
name ∈ dom a.abpurses} = dom a.abpurses dom-defn-map-comp-left-set(20,21)
23 x .conpurses = {name 7→ mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) |
name ∈ dom a.abpurses} conpurses-defn(1)
24 dom x .conpurses = dom a.abpurses =-subs-left(a)(3, 23, 22)
25 dom a.abpurses = dom x .conpurses =-symm(a)(3, 24)
26 dom a.abpurses = dom {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses} =-trans-right(c)(4, 25, 9)
27 from y :PurseId ; y ∈ dom a.abpurses
27.1 y ∈ dom x .conpurses =-subs-right(a)(20, 25, 27.h2)
27.2 a.abpurses(y):AbPurse at-form(27.h1, 19, 27.h2)
27.3 x .conpurses(y):ConPurse at-form(27.h1, 3, 27.1)
27.4 x .conpurses(y).bal :N ConPurse-bal-form(27.3)
27.5 x .conpurses(y) = {name 7→ mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) |
name ∈ dom a.abpurses}(y) =-extend(a)(3, 23, 27.3)
27.6 {name 7→ mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) |
name ∈ dom a.abpurses}(y) = mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},nil)
at-defn-map-comp-left-set(27.h1, 20, 27.h2, 21)
27.7 a.abpurses(y).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(27.2)
27.8 a.abpurses(y).lost :N AbPurse-lost-form(27.2)
27.9 0:N 0-form
27.10 <Idle>:<Idle> <Idle>-form
27.11 Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA> Status-form
27.12 <Idle>:Status Quote-type-extend(27.10, 27.11)
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from a:AbWorld
. . .
27.13 mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost):TD TD-form(27.h1, 27.h1, 27.9, 27.9, 27.8)
27.14 {mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)}:TD-set {a}-form(27.13)
27.15 mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},
nil):ConPurse mk-conPurse-form(27.h1, 27.7, 27.9, 27.12, 27.14)
27.16 mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},nil).bal = a.abpurses(y).bal
ConPurse-bal-defn(27.15)
27.17 mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},nil).exlog :TD-set ConPurse-exlog-form(27.15)
27.18 mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},nil).exlog
= {mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)} ConPurse-exlog-defn(27.15)
27.19 x .conpurses(y) = mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},nil) =-trans(a)(27.3, 27.5, 27.6)
27.20 x .conpurses(y).exlog = {mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)}
=-subs-left(a)(27.3, 27.19, 27.18)
27.21 sumval(mk -ConPurse(y , a.abpurses(y).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)},nil).exlog):N sumval-form(27.17)
27.22 x .conpurses(y).exlog :TD-set ConPurse-exlog-form(27.3)
27.23 sumval(x .conpurses(y).exlog):N sumval-form(27.22)
27.24 sumval(x .conpurses(y).exlog)
= sumval({mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)}) =-extend(a)(27.22, 27.20, 27.23)
27.25 sumval(mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)) =
mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost).val sumval-defn1(27.13)
27.26 mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost).val = a.abpurses(y).lost TD-val-defn(27.13)
27.27 sumval(mk -TD(y , y , 0, 0, a.abpurses(y).lost)) = a.abpurses(y).lost
=-trans(c)(27.8, 27.25, 27.26)
27.28 sumval(x .conpurses(y).exlog) = a.abpurses(y).lost =-trans(c)(27.8 ,27.24, 27.27)
27.29 x .conpurses(y).bal = a.abpurses(y).bal =-subs-left(a)(27.3, 27.19, 27.16)
27.30 mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(y).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(y).exlog)) =
mk -AbPurse(a.abpurses(y).bal , a.abpurses(y).lost) =-mk-AbPurse(27.4, 27.23, 27.29, 27.28)
27.31 mk -AbPurse(a.abpurses(y).bal , a.abpurses(y).lost) = a.abpurses(y) mk-AbPurse-defn(27.2)
27.32 mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(y).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(y).exlog)) = a.abpurses(y)
=-trans(c)(27.2, 27.30 ,27.31)
27.33 {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}(y) =
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(y).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(y).exlog))
at-defn-map-comp-left-set(27.h1, 4, 27.1, 5)
27.34 {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}(y) = a.abpurses(y) =-trans(c)(27.2, 27.33, 27.32)
infer a.abpurses(y) = {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}(y) =-symm(b)(27.2, 27.34)
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from a:AbWorld
. . .
28 ∀p ∈ dom a.abpurses · a.abpurses(p) = {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}(p) ∀-I-set(20,27)
29 a.abpurses = {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses} =-map-defn(19,6,26,28)
30 mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}).abpurses = {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses} abpurses-defn(13)
31 mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈
dom x .conpurses}).abpurses = a.abpurses =-subs-left(a)(19, 29, 30)
32 a.abpurses = mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}).abpurses =-symm(b)(19, 31)
33 a = mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}) =-AbWorld(h1, 13, 18, 32)
34 retr(x ) = mk -AbWorld(x .conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(x .conpurses(name).bal , sumval(x .conpurses(name).exlog)) |
name ∈ dom x .conpurses}) retr-defn(1)
35 retr(x ) = a =-trans-right(c)(13, 34, 33)
infer ∃c:ConWorld · retr(c) = a ∃-I(1, 35)
Lemma con-assign
con-assign
a:AbWorld
mk -ConWorld(a.abauth, {name 7→
mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) | name ∈ dom a.abpurses}):ConWorld
Abbreviations used:
cp = {name 7→ mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil) | name ∈ dom a.abpurses}
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from a:AbWorld
1 mk -AbWorld(a.abauth, a.abpurses) = a mk-AbWorld-defn(h1)
2 a.abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(h1)
3 a.abauth:PurseId -set abauth-form(h1)
4 mk -AbWorld(a.abauth, a.abpurses):AbWorld =-type-inherit-left(h1, 1)
5 inv -AbWorld(a.abauth, a.abpurses) inv-AbWorld-I(4)
6 dom a.abpurses ⊆ a.abauth unfolding(5)
7 dom a.abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(2)
8 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom a.abpurses
8.1 a.abpurses(name):AbPurse at-form(8.h1, 2, 8h2)
8.2 a.abpurses(name).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(8.1)
8.3 a.abpurses(name).lost :N AbPurse-lost-form(8.1)
8.4 0:N 0-form
8.5 <Idle>:<Idle> <Idle>-form
8.6 Status = <Idle> | <EPR> | <EPV> | <EPA> Status-form
8.7 <Idle>:Status Quote-type-extend(8.6, 8.5)
8.8 mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost):TD TD-form(8.h1, 8.h1, 8.4, 8.4, 8.3)
8.9 {mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)}:TD-set {a}-form(8.8)
infer mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, <Idle>,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},
nil):ConPurse mk-ConPurse-form(8.h1, 8.2, 8.4, 8.7, 8.9)
9 dom cp = dom a.abpurses dom-defn-map-comp-left-set(7, 8)
10 dom cp ⊆ a.abauth =-subs-left(b)(7, 9, 6)
11 cp:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse map-comp-form-left-set(7, 8)
12 inv -ConWorld(a.abauth, cp) folding(10)
infer mk -ConWorld(a.abauth, {name 7→
mk -ConPurse(name, a.abpurses(name).bal , 0, 〈Idle〉,nil ,
{mk -TD(name,name, 0, 0, a.abpurses(name).lost)},nil)
| name ∈ dom a.abpurses}):ConWorld mk-ConWorld-form(3, 11, 12)
Lemma sumval-defn1
sumval-defn1
s:TD
sumval({s}) = s.val
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from a:TD
1 {a}:TD-set {a}-form(h1)
2 {}:TD-set {}-form
3 a 6∈ {} {}-is-empty(h1)
4 add(a, {}):TD-set unfolding(1)
5 card ({}):N card-form(2)
6 card (add(a, {})):N card-form(4)
7 succ(card ({})) 6= 0 succ 6=0(5)
8 card (add(a, {})) = succ(card ({})) card-defn-add(h1,2,3)
9 card (add(a, {})) 6= 0 =-subs-left(a)(6,8,7)
10 add(a, {}) 6= {} card6=0-E(4,9)
11 {a} 6= {} unfolding(9)
12 sumval({a}):N sumval-form(1)
13 sumval({}):N sumval-form(2)
14 {a} \ {a} = {} diff-self(1)
15 0:N 0-form
16 {} = {} =-self-I(2)
17 0 = 0 =-self-I(15)
18 {a} \ {a}:TD-set =-type-inherit-left(2,14)
19 if {} = {} then 0 else let x ∈ {} in x .val + sumval({} \ {a}) = 0 condition-true(15,16)
20 sumval({a} \ {a}):N =sub-left(a)(18,14,13)
21 sumval({}) = 0 folding(19)
22 a.val :N TD-val-form(h1)
23 a.val + 0 = a.val +-defn-0-right(22)
24 {a} \ {a}:N diff-form(1,1)
25 sumval({a} \ {a}) = 0 =-subs-left(a)(24,14,21)
26 a.val + sumval({a} \ {a}):N +form(22,20)
27 let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({x} \ {a}) = a.val + sumval({a} \ {a}) let-defn1(1)
28 a.val + sumval({a} \ {a}) = a.val =-subs-left(a)(20,25,23)
29 if {a} = {} then 0 else let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}):N unfolding(12)
30 (let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x})):N let-∈-form(1,26)
31 if {a} = {} then 0 else let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}) =
let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}) condition-false(30,11)
32 let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}) =
if {a} = {} then 0 else let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}) =symm(b)(29,31)
33 let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}) = a.val =-trans(b)(26,27,28)
34 let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}):N =-type-inherit-left(29,32)
35 if {a} = {} then 0 else let x ∈ {a} in x .val + sumval({a} \ {x}) =
a.val =-subs-right(a)(34,32,33)
infer sumval({a}) = a.val folding(35)
G.3 Formation of sumval
Conjecture
sumval-form
s:TD-set
sumval(s):N
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Proof
First, to enhance readability of the proof, make the following syntactic definition:
Σs = (if s = { } then 0 else let x ∈ s in x .val + sumval(s \ {x}))
from s:TD-set
1 card s:N card -form(h1)
2 0:N 0-form
3 from t :TD-set
3.1 from card t = 0
3.1.1 t = { } card -0-E(3.h1, 3.1.h1)
3.1.2 Σt = 0 condition-true(2, 3.1.1)
infer Σt :N =-type-inherit-left(2, 3.1.2)
3.2 card t :N card -form(3.h1)
3.3 δ (card t = 0) δ-=-I(3.2, 2)
infer card t = 0 ⇒ Σt :N ⇒ -I(3.3, 3.1)
4 ∀t :TD-set · card t = 0 ⇒ Σt :N ∀-I(3)
5 from n:N;∀t :TD-set · card t = n ⇒ Σt :N
5.1 from u:TD-set
5.1.1 from card u = succ(n)
5.1.1.1 from x :TD ; x ∈ u
5.1.1.1.1 card u \ {x} = n card -s\{x}=n(5.1.h1, 5.1.1.1.h2, 5.h1, 5.1.1.h1)
5.1.1.1.2 {x}:TD-set {a}-form(5.1.1.1.h1)
5.1.1.1.3 u \ {x}:TD-set diff-form(5.1.h1, 5.1.1.1.2)
5.1.1.1.4 card u \ {x} = n ⇒ Σu \ {x}:N ∀-E(5.1.1.1.3, 5.h2)
5.1.1.1.5 Σu \ {x}:N ⇒ -E-left(5.1.1.1.4, 5.1.1.1.1)
5.1.1.1.6 x .val :N TD-val-form(5.1.1.1.h1)
infer (x .val +Σu \ {x}) :N +-form(5.1.1.1.6, 5.1.1.1.5)
5.1.1.3 (let x ∈ u in x .val +Σu \ {x}) :N let-∈-form(5.1.h1, 5.1.1.1)
5.1.1.4 { }:TD-set { }-form
5.1.1.5 δ (u = { }) δ-=-I(5.1.h1, 5.1.1.4)
infer (if u = { } then 0 else let x ∈ u in
x .val +Σ(u \ {x})):N ITE-form(5.1.1.5, 2, 5.1.1.3)
5.1.2 card u:N card -form(5.1.h1)
5.1.3 succ(n):N succ-form(5.h1)
5.1.4 δ (card u = succ(n)) δ-=-I(5.1.2, 5.1.3)
infer card u = succ(n) ⇒ Σu:N ⇒ -I(5.1.4, 5.1.1)
infer ∀t :TD-set · card t = succ(n) ⇒ Σt :N ∀-I(5.1)
6 ∀u:TD-set · card u = card s ⇒ Σu:N N-indn(1, 4, 5)
7 card s = card s ⇒ Σs:N ∀-E(h1, 6)
8 card s = card s =-self-I(1)
infer Σs:N ⇒ -E-left(7, 8)
Lemma diff-{a}-⊂
diff-{a}-⊂
s:A-set; x ∈ s; x :A
s \ {x} ⊂ s
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from s:A-set; x ∈ s; x :A
1 {x}:A-set {x}-form(h3)
2 s \ {x}:A-set diff-form(h1,1)
3 s \ {x} ⊂ s ⇔ s \ {x} ⊆ s ∧ s \ {x} 6= s ⊂-defn(2,h1)
4 s \ {x} ⊆ s ⇔ ∀a ∈ s \ {x} · a ∈ s ⊆-defn(2,h1)
5 from a:A
5.1 from a ∈ s \ {x}
infer a ∈ s ∈-diff-E-right(5.h1,h1,1,5.1.h1)
5.2 δ(a ∈ s \ {x}) δ-∈(5.h1,1)
infer a ∈ s \ {x} ⇒ a ∈ s ⇒ -I(5.2,5.1)
6 ∀a ∈ s \ {x} · a ∈ s ∀-I(5)
7 δ(s \ {x} = s) δ-=-I(2,h1)
8 from s \ {x} = s
8.1 s \ {x} ⊆ s ∧ s ⊆ s \ {x} =-set-E(1,8.h1)
8.2 s ⊆ s \ {x} ∧-E-L(8.1)
8.3 x ∈ s \ {x} ⊆-E(h3,h1,2,h2,8.2)
8.4 x /∈ {x} ∈-diff-E-left(h3,h1,1,8.3)
8.5 x ∈ {x} ∈-{a}-I(h3)
infer false contradiction(8.4,8.5)
9 s \ {x} ⊆ s ⇔ -E-R(4,6)
10 s \ {x} 6= s false-contr(7,8)
11 s \ {x} ⊆ s ∧ s \ {x} 6= s ∧-I(9,10)
infer s \ {x} ⊂ s ⇔ -E-R(3,11)
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H Operation Modelling Proofs
H.1 Operation Modelling Proof for ConTransferLostValFail
We show that the concrete operation ConTransferLostValFailmodels the abstract operation AbTransferLost
under the retrieve function. We examine the domain and result obligations in turn.
H.1.1 Domain Obligation
Conjecture
TransferLost-dom
c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val) ⇒ pre-ConTransferLostValFail(c,fid , tid , val)
Proof
from c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
1. from pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val)
1.1 fid 6= tid ∧ fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧
retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val unfolding(1.h1)
1.2 fid 6= tid ∧-E-right(1.1)
1.3 fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(1.1))
1.4 tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧-E-left(∧-E-right(1.1))
1.5 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val ∧-E-left(1.1)
1.6 dom retr(c).abpurses = dom c.conpurses dom-purses-=(h1)
1.7 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
1.8 retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(1.7)
1.9 dom retr(c).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(1.8)
1.10 fid ∈ dom c.conpurses =-subs-right(a)(1.9, 1.6, 1.3)
1.11 tid ∈ dom c.conpurses =-subs-right(a)(1.9, 1.6, 1.4)
1.12 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal = c.conpurses(fid).bal bal-purses-=(h1, h2, 1.10, 1.3)
1.13 retr(c).abpurses(fid):AbPurse at-form(h2, 1.8, 1.3)
1.14 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(1.13)
1.15 c.conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val =-subs-right(a)(1.14, 1.12, 1.5)
1.16 fid 6= tid ∧ fid ∈ dom c.conpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom c.conpurses ∧
c.conpurses(fid).bal ≥ val ∧-I(1.2, ∧-I(1.10, ∧-I(1.11, 1.15)))
infer pre-ConTransferLostValFail(c,fid , tid , val) folding(1.16)
2. δ(pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val)) δ-pre-AbTransferLost(h1, h2, h3, h4)
infer pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val) ⇒
pre-ConTransferLostValFail(c,fid , tid , val) ⇒ -I(1,2)
Lemma dom-purses-=
dom-purses-=
c:ConWorld
dom retr(c).abpurses = dom c.conpurses
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from c:ConWorld
1 c.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
2 dom c.conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(1)
3 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
4 retr(c) = mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)}) retr-defn(h1)
5 retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(3)
6 dom retr(c).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(5)
7 mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)}):AbWorld =-type-inherit-right(3,4)
8 mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses}).abpurses
=
{name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)} abpurses-defn(7)
9 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom c.conpurses
infer mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog):AbPurse ConWorld-AbWorld-form(9.h1, h1, 9.h2)
10 retr(c).abpurses = mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)}).abpurses =-extend(a)(3,4,5)
11 retr(c).abpurses = {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)} =-trans(a)(5,10,8)
12 dom retr(c).abpurses = dom {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)} =-extend(a)(5,11,6)
13 dom {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)} = dom c.conpurses dom-defn-map-comp-left-set(2,9)
infer dom retr(c).abpurses = dom c.conpurses =-trans(c)(2,12,13)
Lemma bal-purses-=
bal-purses-equal
c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ;fid ∈ dom c.conpurses;fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal = c.conpurses(fid).bal
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from c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ;fid ∈ dom c.conpurses;fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
1 retr(c) = mk -AbWorld(c.conauth,
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom c.conpurses}) retr-defn(h1)
2 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
3 retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(2)
4 retr(c).abpurses = retr(c).abpurses =-self-I(3)
5 retr(c).abpurses = mk -AbWorld(...).abpurses =-subs-right(a)(2, 1, 4)
6 mk -AbWorld(...).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse =-type-inherit-right(3, 5)
7 mk -AbWorld(...):AbWorld =-type-inherit-right(2, 1)
8 mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses}).abpurses =
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses} abpurses-defn(7)
9 retr(c).abpurses = {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses} =-subs-left(b)(6, 5, 8)
10 retr(c).abpurses(fid):AbPurse at-form(h2, 3, h4)
11 retr(c).abpurses(fid) = retr(c).abpurses(fid) =-self-I(10)
12 retr(c).abpurses(fid) = {name 7→ ...}(fid) =-subs-right(a)(3, 9, 11)
13 {name 7→ ...}(fid):AbPurse =-type-inherit-right(10, 12)
14 c.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
15 dom c.conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(14)
16 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom c.conpurses
infer mk -AbPurse(...):AbPurse ConWorld-AbWorld-form(16.h1, h1, 16.h2)
17 {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses}(fid) =
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(fid).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(fid).exlog)) at-defn-map-comp-left-set(h2, 15, h3, 16)
18 retr(c).abpurses(fid) = mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(fid).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(fid).exlog)) =-subs-left(b)(13, 12, 17)
19 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(10)
20 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal = retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal =-self-I(19)
21 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal = mk -AbPurse(...).bal =-subs-right(a) (10, 18, 20)
22 mk -AbPurse(...).bal :N =-type-inherit-right(19, 21)
23 mk -AbPurse(...):AbPurse =-type-inherit-right(10, 18)
24 mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(fid).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(fid).exlog)).bal =
c.conpurses(fid).bal AbPurse-bal-defn(23)
infer retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal = c.conpurses(fid).bal =-subs-left(b)(22, 21, 24)
Lemma conworld-abworld-form
ConWorld-AbWorld-form
n:PurseId ; c:ConWorld ;n ∈ dom c.conpurses
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(n).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(n).exlog)):AbPurse
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from n:PurseId ; c:ConWorld ;n ∈ dom c.conpurses
1 c.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h2)
2 c.conpurses(n):ConPurse at-form(h1,1,h3)
3 c.conpurses(n).exlog :TD-set ConPurse-exlog-form(2)
4 sumval(c.conpurses(n).exlog):N sumval-form(3)
5 c.conpurses(n).bal :N ConPurse-bal-form(2)
infer mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(n).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(n).exlog)):AbPurse mk-AbPurse-form(5,4)
Lemma δ-pre-abtransferlost
δ-pre-AbTransferLost
c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
δ(pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val))
from c:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
1 δ(fid 6= tid) δ- 6=-I(h2, h3)
2 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
3 retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(2)
4 dom retr(c).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(3)
5 δ(fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses) δ-∈(h2, 4)
6 δ(tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses) δ-∈(h3, 4)
7 δ(fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses) δ-∧-inherit(5, 6)
8 from fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
8.1 fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧-E-right(8.h1)
8.2 retr(c).abpurses(fid):AbPurse at-form(h2, 3, 8.1)
8.3 retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(8.2)
infer δ(retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val) δ-≥(8.3, h4)
9 δ(fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧
retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val) δ-∧-inherit-sqt(7, 8)
10 δ(fid 6= tid ∧ fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∧
retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val) δ-∧-inherit(1, 9)
infer δ(pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val)) folding(10)
Lemma δ-≥
δ-≥
a:N; b:N
δ(a ≥ b)
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from a:N; b:N
1 from k :N
1.1 (b + k):N +-form(h2, 1.h1)
infer δ(b + k = a) δ-=-I(1.1, h1)
2 δ(∃k :N · b + k = a) δ-∃-inherit(1)
infer δ(a ≥ b) folding(2)
H.1.2 Result Obligation
Conjecture
TransferLost-res
c:ConWorld ;↼−c :ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N
pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val); post-ConTransferLostValFail(c,↼−c ,fid , tid , val)
post-AbTransferLost(retr(c), retr(↼−c ),fid , tid , val)
Proof
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from c:ConWorld ;↼−c :ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val);
post-ConTransferLostValFail(c,↼−c ,fid , tid , val)
1 fid 6= tid ∧ fid ∈ dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses ∧ tid ∈ dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses ∧
retr(↼−c ).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ val unfolding(h6)
2 totalC (↼−c .conpurses(fid)) = totalC (c.conpurses(fid)) ∧
↼−c .conpurses(fid).bal ≥ c.conpurses(fid).bal ∧
c.conpurses(tid).bal =↼−c .conpurses(tid).bal ∧
c.conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−c .conpurses(tid).exlog ∧
c.conpurses(fid).seqno ≥↼−c .conpurses(fid).seqno ∧
c.conpurses(tid).seqno ≥↼−c .conpurses(tid).seqno ∧
c.conpurses(fid).status = <Idle> ∧ c.conpurses(tid).status = <Idle> ∧
dom↼−c .conpurses = dom c.conpurses ∧↼−c .conauth = c.conauth ∧
∀pid ∈ (dom c.conpurses \ {fid , tid})·
↼−c .conpurses(pid) = c.conpurses(pid) unfolding(h7)
3 totalC (↼−c .conpurses(fid)) = totalC (c.conpurses(fid)) ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(2))
4 ↼−c .conpurses(fid).bal ≥ c.conpurses(fid).bal ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(2))
5 dom↼−c .conpurses = dom c.conpurses ∧-E-left(∧-E-right(2))
6 ↼−c .conauth = c.conauth ∧-E-left(∧-E-right(2))
7 ∀pid ∈ (dom c.conpurses \ {fid , tid}) ·↼−c .conpurses(pid) = c.conpurses(pid)
∧-E-left(2)
8 c.conpurses(tid).bal =↼−c .conpurses(tid).bal ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(2))
9 c.conpurses(tid).exlog =↼−c .conpurses(tid).exlog ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(2))
10 fid ∈ dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(1))
11 tid ∈ dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses ∧-E-right(∧-E-left(1))
12 dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses = dom retr(c).abpurses post-dom-=(h1, h2, 5)
13 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
14 retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(13)
15 dom retr(c).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(14)
16 retr(↼−c ):AbWorld retr-form(h2)
17 retr(↼−c ).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(16)
18 dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(17)
19 fid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∈-=-set(h3, 18, 15, 10, 12)
20 tid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses ∈-=-set(h4, 18, 15, 11, 12)
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from c:ConWorld ;↼−c :ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; val :N;
pre-AbTransferLost(retr(c),fid , tid , val);
post-ConTransferLostValFail(c,↼−c ,fid , tid , val)
...
21 dom retr(c).abpurses = dom c.conpurses dom-purses-=(h1)
22 dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses = dom↼−c .conpurses dom-purses-=(h2)
23 c.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
24 dom c.conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(23)
25 ↼−c .conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h2)
26 dom↼−c .conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(25)
27 fid ∈ dom c.conpurses ∈-=-set(h3, 15, 24, 19, 21)
28 tid ∈ dom c.conpurses ∈-=-set(h4, 15, 24, 20, 21)
29 fid ∈ dom↼−c .conpurses ∈-=-set(h3, 18, 26, 10, 22)
30 tid ∈ dom↼−c .conpurses ∈-=-set(h4, 18, 26, 11, 22)
31 totalA(retr(c).abpurses(fid)) = totalA(retr(↼−c ).abpurses(fid))
post-total-=(h1, h2, h3, 3, 19, 10, 27, 29)
32 retr(↼−c ).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal
post-bal-≥(h1, h2, h3, 19, 10, 27, 29, 4)
33 retr(↼−c ).abauth = retr(c).abauth post-abauth-=(h2, h1, 6)
34 ∀pid ∈ (dom retr(c).abpurses \ {fid})·
retr(↼−c ).abpurses(pid) = retr(c).abpurses(pid)
post-∀-=(h1, h2, h3, h4, 20, 11, 28, 30, 12, 7, 8, 9)
35 totalA(retr(c).abpurses(fid)) = totalA(retr(↼−c ).abpurses(fid)) ∧
retr(↼−c ).abpurses(fid).bal ≥ retr(c).abpurses(fid).bal ∧
dom retr(↼−c ).abpurses = dom retr(c).abpurses ∧
retr(↼−c ).abauth = retr(c).abauth ∧
∀pid ∈ (dom retr(c).abpurses \ {fid})·
retr(↼−c ).abpurses(pid) = retr(c).abpurses(pid)
∧-I(31,∧-I(32, ∧-I(12, ∧-I(33, 34))))
infer post-AbTransferLost(retr(c), retr(↼−c ),fid , tid , val) folding(35)
Lemma rule-∈-=-set
∈-=-set
a:A; s1:A-Set ; s2:A-set ; a ∈ s1; s1 = s2
a ∈ s2
from a:A; s1:A-Set ; s2:A-set ; a ∈ s1; s1 = s2
1 (s1 ⊆ s2) ∧ (s2 ⊆ s1) =-set-E(h2,h5)
2 s1 ⊆ s2 ∧-E-right(1)
infer a ∈ s2 ⊆-E(h1, h2, h3, h4, 2)
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Lemma post-dom-=
post-dom-=
a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ;dom b.conpurses = dom a.conpurses
dom retr(b).abpurses = dom retr(a).abpurses
from a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ;dom b.conpurses = dom a.conpurses
1 b.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurse-form(h2)
2 dom b.conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(1)
3 a.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurse-form(h1)
4 dom a.conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(3)
5 dom retr(b).abpurses = dom b.conpurses dom-purses-=(h2)
6 dom retr(a).abpurses = dom a.conpurses dom-purses-=(h1)
7 dom retr(b).abpurses = dom a.conpurses =-trans(b)(2, 5, h3)
infer dom retr(b).abpurses = dom retr(a).abpurses =-trans-right(a)(4, 6, 7)
Lemma post-total-=
post-total-=
a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ;
totalC (b.conpurses(pid)) = totalC (a.conpurses(pid)); pid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses;
pid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses; pid ∈ dom a.conpurses; pid ∈ dom b.conpurses;
totalA(retr(a).abpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(b).abpurses(pid)
from a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ;
totalC (b.conpurses(pid)) = totalC (a.conpurses(pid)); pid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses;
pid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses; pid ∈ dom a.conpurses; pid ∈ dom b.conpurses
1 totalC (a.conpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(a).abpurses(pid)) total-purses-=(h1, h3, h7, h5)
2 totalC (b.conpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(b).abpurses(pid)) total-purses-=(h2, h3, h8, h6)
3 b.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h2)
4 b.conpurses(pid):ConPurse at-form(h3, 3, h8)
5 totalC (b.conpurses(pid)):N total-C-form(4)
6 totalC (b.conpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(a).abpurses(pid)) =-trans(a)(5, h4, 1)
infer totalA(retr(a).abpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(b).abpurses(pid)) =-trans-left(a)(5, 6, 2)
Lemma total-C-form
total-C-form
p:ConPurse
totalC (p):N
from p:ConPurse
1 p.bal :N ConPurse-bal-form(h1)
2 p.exlog :TD-set ConPurse-exlog-form(h1)
3 sumval(p.exlog)):N sumval-form(2)
4 (p.bal + sumval(p.exlog)):N +-form(1,3)
infer totalC (p):N folding(4)
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Lemma total-purses-=
total-purses-=
c:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ; pid ∈ dom c.conpurses; pid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
totalC (c.conpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(c).abpurses(pid))
from c:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ; pid ∈ dom c.conpurses; pid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
1. c.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
2. c.conpurses(pid):ConPurse at-form(h2, 1, h3)
3. totalC (c.conpurses(pid)) =
c.conpurses(pid).bal + sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog) totalC-defn(2)
4. totalC (c.conpurses(pid)):N totalC-form(2)
5. retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
6. retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(5)
7. retr(c).abpurses(pid):AbPurse at-form(h2, 6, h4)
8. totalA(retr(c).abpurses(pid)) =
retr(c).abpurses(pid).bal + retr(c).abpurses(pid).lost totalA-defn(7)
9. retr(c).abpurses(pid) = mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog)) at-mk-AbPurse-defn(h1, h2, h3, h4)
10. mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog)):
AbPurse =-type-inherit-right(7,9)
11. mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog)).bal =
c.conpurses(pid).bal abpurse-bal-defn(10)
12. mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog)).lost =
sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog) abpurse-lost-defn(10)
13. retr(c).abpurses(pid).bal = c.conpurses(pid).bal =-subs-left(a)(7,9,11)
14. retr(c).abpurses(pid).lost = sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog) =-subs-left(a)(7,9,12)
15. retr(c).abpurses(pid).bal :N AbPurse-bal-form(7)
16. c.conpurses(pid).bal :N ConPurse-bal-form(2)
17. retr(c).abpurses(pid).lost :N AbPurse-lost-form(7)
18. retr(c).abpurses(pid).bal + retr(c).abpurses.lost =
c.conpurses(pid).bal + sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog) +-=(13, 14, 15, 16, 17)
19. totalC (c.conpurses(pid)) =
retr(c).abpurses(pid).bal + retr(c).abpurses.lost =-trans-right(a)(4,3,18)
infer totalC (c.conpurses(pid)) = totalA(retr(c).abpurses(pid)) =-trans-right(a)(4,19,8)
Lemma rule-+-=
+-=
a = b; c = d ; a:N; b:N; c:N
a + c = b + d
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from a = b; c = d ; a:N; b:N; c:N
1 a + 0 = a +-defn-0-right(h3)
2 b + 0 = b +-defn-0-right(h4)
3 a + 0 = b =-trans(b)(h3, 1, h1)
4 a + 0 = b + 0 =-trans-right(c)(h4, 3, 2)
5 from k :N; a + k = b + k
5.1 a + k :N +-form(h3, 5.h1)
5.2 b + k :N +-form(h4, 5.h1)
5.3 a + succ(k) = succ(a + k) +-defn-succ-right(h3, 5.h1)
5.4 b + succ(k) = succ(b + k) +-defn-succ-right(h4, 5.h1)
5.5 succ(b + k):N succ-form(5.2)
5.6 a + succ(k) = succ(b + k) =-subs-right(a)(5.1,5.h2,5.3)
infer a + succ(k) = b + succ(k) =-trans-right(c)(5.5, 5.6, 5.4)
6 a + c = b + c N-indn(h5, 4, 5)
infer a + c = b + d =-subs-right(a)(h5, h2, 6)
Lemma post-bal-≥
post-bal-≥
a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ; pid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses;
pid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses; pid ∈ dom a.conpurses; pid ∈ dom b.conpurses;
b.conpurses(pid).bal ≥ a.conpurses(pid).bal
retr(b).abpurses(pid).bal ≥ retr(a).abpurses(pid).bal
from a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ; pid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses;
pid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses; pid ∈ dom a.conpurses; pid ∈ dom b.conpurses;
b.conpurses(pid).bal ≥ a.conpurses(pid).bal
1 retr(b).abpurses(pid).bal = b.conpurses(pid).bal bal-purses-equal(h2, h3, h7, h5)
2 retr(a).abpurses(pid).bal = a.conpurses(pid).bal bal-purses-equal(h1, h3, h6, h4)
3 retr(a).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurse-form(h1)
4 retr(a).abpurses(pid):AbPurse at-form(h3, 3, h4)
5 retr(a).abpurses(pid).bal :N bal-form(4)
6 a.conpurses(pid).bal = retr(a).abpurses(pid).bal =-symm(a)(5, 2)
7 retr(b).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurse-form(h2)
8 retr(b).abpurses(pid):AbPurse at-form(h3, 7, h5)
9 retr(b).abpurses(pid).bal :N bal-form(8)
10 b.conpurses(pid).bal ≥ retr(a).abpurses(pid).bal =-subs-right(b)(5, 6, h8)
11 b.conpurses(pid).bal = retr(b).abpurses(pid).bal =-symm(a)(9, 1)
infer retr(b).abpurses(pid).bal ≥ retr(a).abpurses(pid).bal =-subs-right(b)(9, 11, 10)
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Lemma post-∀-=
post-∀-=
a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ; tid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses;
tid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses; tid ∈ dom a.conpurses; tid ∈ dom b.conpurses;
dom retr(b).abpurses = dom retr(a).abpurses;
∀pid ∈ (dom a.conpurses \ {fid , tid}) · b.conpurses(pid) = a.conpurses(pid);
a.conpurses(tid).bal = b.conpurses(tid).bal ; a.conpurses(tid).exlog = b.conpurses(tid).exlog
∀pid ∈ (dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid}) · retr(b).abpurses(pid) = retr(a).abpurses(pid)
from a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ;
tid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses; tid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses;
tid ∈ dom a.conpurses; tid ∈ dom b.conpurses;
dom retr(b).abpurses = dom retr(a).abpurses;
∀pid ∈ (dom a.conpurses \ {fid , tid}) · b.conpurses(pid) = a.conpurses(pid);
a.conpurses(tid).bal = b.conpurses(tid).bal ;
a.conpurses(tid).exlog = b.conpurses(tid).exlog
1 a.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
2 a.conpurses(tid):ConPurse at-form(h4, 1, h7)
3 a.conpurses(tid).bal :N ConPurse-bal-form(2)
4 a.conpurses(tid).exlog :TD-set ConPurse-exlog-form(2)
5 sumval(a.conpurses(tid).exlog)):N sumval-form(4)
6 sumval(a.conpurses(tid).exlog)) = sumval(b.conpurses(tid).exlog))
=-extend(a)(4, h12, 5)
7 retr(a):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
8 retr(a).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(7)
9 retr(b):AbWorld retr-form(h2)
10 retr(b).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(9)
11 retr(b).abpurses(tid):AbPurse at-form(h4, 10, h6)
12 retr(b).abpurses(tid) = mk -AbPurse(b.conpurses(tid).bal ,
sumval(b.conpurses(tid).exlog)) at-mk-AbPurse-defn(h2, h4, h8, h6)
13 mk -AbPurse(a.conpurses(tid).bal , sumval(a.conpurses(tid).exlog)) =
mk -AbPurse(b.conpurses(tid).bal , sumval(b.conpurses(tid).exlog))
=-mk-AbPurse(3, 5, h11, 6)
14 retr(b).abpurses(tid) = mk -AbPurse(a.conpurses(tid).bal ,
sumval(a.conpurses(tid).exlog)) =-trans-right(a)(11, 12, 13)
15 retr(a).abpurses(tid) = mk -AbPurse(a.conpurses(tid).bal ,
sumval(a.conpurses(tid).exlog)) at-mk-AbPurse-defn(h1, h4, h7, h5)
16 retr(b).abpurses(tid) = retr(a).abpurses(tid) =-trans-right(a)(11, 14, 15)
17 dom retr(a).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(8)
18 {fid , tid}:PurseId -set {a,b}-form(h3, h4)
19 dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid , tid}:PurseId -set diff-form(17, 18)
20 dom retr(a).abpurses = dom a.conpurses dom-purses-=(h1)
21 ∀pid ∈ (dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid , tid})·
b.conpurses(pid) = a.conpurses(pid) =-subs-left(a)(17, 20, h10)
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from a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ;fid :PurseId ; tid :PurseId ;
tid ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses; tid ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses;
tid ∈ dom a.conpurses; tid ∈ dom b.conpurses;
dom retr(b).abpurses = dom retr(a).abpurses;
∀pid ∈ (dom a.conpurses \ {fid , tid}) · b.conpurses(pid) = a.conpurses(pid);
a.conpurses(tid).bal = b.conpurses(tid).bal ;
a.conpurses(tid).exlog = b.conpurses(tid).exlog
...
22 from y :PurseId ; y ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid , tid}
22.1 y ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses \ {fid , tid} =-subs-left(b)(17, h9, 22.h2)
22.2 dom retr(b).abpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(10)
22.3 y ∈ dom retr(b).abpurses ∈-diff-E-right(22.h1, 22.2, 18, 22.1)
22.4 dom retr(b).abpurses = dom b.conpurses dom-purses-=(h2)
22.5 y ∈ dom b.conpurses =-subs-right(a)(22.2, 22.4, 22.3)
22.6 retr(b).abpurses(y) = mk -AbPurse(b.conpurses(y).bal ,
sumval(b.conpurses(y).exlog)) at-mk-AbPurse-defn(h2, 22.h1, 22.6, 22.3)
22.7 y ∈ dom retr(a).abpurses ∈-diff-E-right(22.h1, 17, 18, 22.h2)
22.8 y ∈ dom a.conpurses =-subs-right(a)(17, 20, 22.7)
22.9 retr(a).abpurses(y) = mk -AbPurse(a.conpurses(y).bal ,
sumval(a.conpurses(y).exlog)) at-mk-AbPurse-defn(h1, 22.h1, 22.8, 22.7)
22.10 a.conpurses(y):ConPurse at-form(22.h1, 1, 22.8)
22.11 b.conpurses(y) = a.conpurses(y) ∀-E-set(22.h1, 19, 22.h2, 21)
22.12 retr(a).abpurses(y) = mk -AbPurse(b.conpurses(y).bal ,
sumval(b.conpurses(y).exlog)) =-subs-left(b)(22.10, 22.11, 22.9)
22.13 retr(b).abpurses(y):AbPurse at-form(22.h1, 10, 22.3)
infer retr(b).abpurses(y) = retr(a).abpurses(y) =-trans-right(a)(22.13, 22.6, 22.12)
23 ∀pid ∈ (dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid , tid})·
retr(b).abpurses(pid) = retr(a).abpurses(pid) ∀-I-set(19, 22)
24 {fid}: {PurseId} {a}-form(h3)
25 dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid}: {PurseId} diff-form(17,24)
infer ∀pid ∈ (dom retr(a).abpurses \ {fid})·
retr(b).abpurses(pid) = retr(a).abpurses(pid) ∀-elem-I(h4, 16, 25, 23)
Lemma at-mk-abpurse-defn
at-mk-AbPurse-defn
c:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ; pid ∈ dom c.conpurses; pid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
retr(c).abpurses(pid) = mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog))
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from c:ConWorld ; pid :PurseId ; pid ∈ dom c.conpurses; pid ∈ dom retr(c).abpurses
1 retr(c) = mk -AbWorld(c.conauth,
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog))
| name ∈ dom c.conpurses}) retr-defn(h1)
2 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
3 retr(c).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse abpurses-form(2)
4 retr(c).abpurses = retr(c).abpurses =-self-I(3)
5 retr(c).abpurses = mk -AbWorld(...).abpurses =-subs-right(a)(2, 1, 4)
6 mk -AbWorld(...).abpurses:PurseId
m
−→ AbPurse =-type-inherit-right(3, 5)
7 mk -AbWorld(...):AbWorld =-type-inherit-right(2, 1)
8 mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses}).abpurses =
{name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses} abpurses-defn(7)
9 retr(c).abpurses = {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses} =-subs-left(b)(6, 5, 8)
10 retr(c).abpurses(pid):AbPurse at-form(h2, 3, h4)
11 retr(c).abpurses(pid) = retr(c).abpurses(pid) =-self-I(10)
12 retr(c).abpurses(pid) = {name 7→ ...}(pid) =-subs-right(a)(3, 9, 11)
13 {name 7→ ...}(pid):AbPurse =-type-inherit-right(10, 12)
14 c.conpurses:PurseId
m
−→ ConPurse conpurses-form(h1)
15 dom c.conpurses:PurseId -set dom-form(14)
16 from name:PurseId ;name ∈ dom c.conpurses
infer mk -AbPurse(...):AbPurse ConWorld-AbWorld-form(16.h1, h1, 16.h2)
17 {name 7→ mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog)) | name ∈ dom c.conpurses}(pid) =
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog)) at-defn-map-comp-left-set(h2, 15, h3, 16)
infer retr(c).abpurses(pid) = mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(pid).bal ,
sumval(c.conpurses(pid).exlog)) =-subs-left(b)(13, 12, 17)
Lemma {a, b}-form
{a,b}-form
a:A; b:A
{a, b}:A-set
from a:A; b:A
1. {a, b} = add(a, add(b, {})) {a,b}-defn(h1, h2)
2. {}:A-set {}-form
3. add(a, add(b, {})):A-set add-add-form(h1, h2, 3)
infer {a, b}:A-set =-type-inherit-left(3, 1)
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Lemma ∀-elem-I
∀-elem-I
a:A;P(a); s:A-Set ;∀b ∈ s \ {a} · P(b)
∀b ∈ s · P(b)
from a:A;P(a); s:A-set;∀b ∈ s \ {a} · P(b)
1. {a}:A-set {a}-form(h1)
2. from y :A; y ∈ s
2.1 y ∈ {a} ∨ y /∈ {a} ∈-∨-/∈(2.h1, 1)
2.2 from y ∈ {a}
2.2.1 y = a ∈-{a}-E(h1, 2.h1, 2.2.h1)
infer P(y) =-subs-left(b)(h1, 2.2.1, h2)
2.3 from y /∈ {a}
2.3.1 s \ {a}:A-set diff-form(h3, 1)
2.3.2 y ∈ s \ {a} ∈-diff-I(2.h1, h3, 1, 2.h2, 2.3.h1)
infer P(y) ∀-E-set(2.h1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, h4)
infer P(y) ∨-E(2.1, 2.2, 2.3)
infer ∀b ∈ s · P(b) ∀-I-set(h3, 2)
Lemma post-abauth-=
post-abauth-=
a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ; a.conauth = b.conauth
retr(a).abauth = retr(b).abauth
Proof
from a:ConWorld ; b:ConWorld ; a.conauth = b.conauth
1 b.conauth:PurseId -set conauth-form(h2)
2 a.conauth:PurseId -set conauth-form(h1)
3 b.conauth = retr(b).abauth auth-=(h2)
4 a.conauth = retr(a).abauth auth-=(h1)
5 a.conauth = retr(b).abauth =-trans(a)(2, h3, 3)
infer retr(a).abauth = retr(b).abauth =-trans-left(a)(2, 4, 5)
Lemma auth-=
auth-=
c:ConWorld
c.conauth = retr(c).abauth
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from c:ConWorld
1 c.conauth:PurseId -set conauth-form(h1)
2 retr(c):AbWorld retr-form(h1)
3 retr(c) = mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)} retr-defn(h1)
4 retr(c).abauth:PurseId -set abauth-form(2)
5 mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses)}:AbWorld =-type-inherit-right(2, 3)
6 mk -AbWorld(c.conauth, {name 7→
mk -AbPurse(c.conpurses(name).bal , sumval(c.conpurses(name).exlog) |
name ∈ dom c.conpurses}).abauth = c.conauth abauth-defn(5)
7 retr(c).abauth = c.conauth =-subs-left(a)(2,3,6)
infer c.conauth = retr(c).abauth =-symm(b)(1,7)
Lemma =-mk-abpurse
=-mk-AbPurse
x :N; y :N; x = a; y = b
mk -AbPurse(x , y) = mk -AbPurse(a, b)
from x :N; y :N; x = a; y = b
1 mk -AbPurse(x , y):AbPurse mk-AbPurse-form(h1, h2)
2 mk -AbPurse(x , y) = mk -AbPurse(x , y) =-self-I(1)
3 mk -AbPurse(x , y) = mk -AbPurse(a, y) =-subs-right(a)(h1, h3, 2)
infer mk -AbPurse(x , y) = mk -AbPurse(a, b) =-subs-right(a)(h2, h4, 3)
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I Miscellaneous Proofs
I.1 Miscellaneous proofs in underlying theories
diff-not-eq
a ∈ t ; a:X ; t :X -set
¬(t \ {a} = t)
from a ∈ t ; a:X ; t :X -set
1 a ∈ {a} ∈-{a}-I-=(h2)
2 {a}:X -set {a}-form(h2)
3 t \ {a}:X -set diff-form(h3,2)
4 ¬¬(a ∈ {a}) ¬¬-I(1)
5 ¬(a 6∈ {a}) folding(4)
6 ¬(a ∈ t ∧ a 6∈ {a}) ¬-∧-I-left(5)
7 a ∈ t \ {a} ⇔ a ∈ t ∧ a 6∈ {a} ∈-diff-defn(h2,h3,2)
8 ¬(a ∈ t \ {a}) ⇔ -E-right-¬(7,6)
9 ¬(∀x ∈ t · x ∈ t \ {a}) ¬-∀-I-¬(h2,8)
10 t ⊆ t \ {a} ⇔ ∀x ∈ t · x ∈ t \ {a} ⊆-defn(h3,3)
11 ¬(t ⊆ t \ {a}) ⇔ -E-right-¬(10,9)
12 ¬(t ⊆ t \ {a} ∧ t \ {a} ⊆ t) ¬-∧-I-right(11)
13 t = t \ {a} ⇔ t ⊆ t \ {a} ∧ t \ {a} ⊆ t =-set-defn(h3,3)
infer ¬(t \ {a} = t) ⇔ -E-right-¬(13,12)
complete-set-indn
s:A-set;
∃a:A · a /∈ s;
∀t :A-set · ∀t ′:A-set · t ′ ⊂ t ⇒ P(t ′)
P(s)
from s:A-set;∃a:A · a /∈ s;
∀t :A-set · ∀t ′:A-set · t ′ ⊂ t ⇒ P(t ′)
1 from a:A; a /∈ s
1.1 add(a, s):A-set add-form(1.h1,h1)
1.2 s ⊂ add(a, s) ⊂-add(1.h1,h1,1.h2)
1.3 ∀t ′:A-set · t ′ ⊂ add(a, s) ⇒ P(t ′) ∀-E(1.1,h3)
1.4 s ⊂ add(a, s) ⇒ P(s) ∀-E(h1,1.3)
infer P(s) ⇒ -E-left(1.4,1.2)
infer P(s) ∃-E(h2,1)
6=-add
a:A; s:A-set; a /∈ s
s 6= add(a, s)
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from a:A; s:A-set; a /∈ s
1 add(a, s):A-set add-form(h1,h2)
2 a ∈ add(a, s) ∈-add-I-elem(h1,h2)
3 ∃x ∈ add(a, s) · x /∈ s ∃-I-set(h1,1,2,h3)
4 ¬¬ (∃x ∈ add(a, s) · x /∈ s) ¬¬ -I(3)
5 ¬ (∀x ∈ add(a, s) · x ∈ s) folding(4)
6 add(a, s) ⊆ s ⇔ ∀x ∈ add(a, s) · x ∈ s ⊆-defn(1,h2)
7 ¬ (add(a, s) ⊆ s) ⇔ -E-right-¬ (6,5)
8 ¬ (s ⊆ add(a, s) ∧ add(a, s) ⊆ s) ¬ -∧-I-left(7)
9 s = add(a, s) ⇔ (s ⊆ add(a, s) ∧ add(a, s) ⊆ s) =-set-defn(h2,1)
infer s 6= add(a, s) ⇔ -E-right-¬ (9,8)
⊂-add
a:A; s:A-set; a /∈ s
s ⊂ add(a, s)
from a:A; s:A-set; a /∈ s
1 add(a, s):A-set add-form(h1, h2)
2 s ⊂ add(a, s) ⇔ s ⊆ add(a, s) ∧ s 6= add(a, s) ⊂-defn(h2, 1)
3 s ⊆ add(a, s) ⇔ ∀x ∈ s · x ∈ add(a, s) ⊆-defn(h2, 1)
4 from x :A; x ∈ s
4.1 x = a ∨ x ∈ s ∨-I-left(4.h2)
4.2 x ∈ add(a, s) ⇔ x = a ∨ x ∈ s ∈-add-defn(4.h1, h1, h2)
infer x ∈ add(a, s) ⇔ -E-right(4.2, 4.1)
5 ∀x ∈ s · x ∈ add(a, s) ∀-I-set(h2, 4)
6 s ⊆ add(a, s) ⇔ -E-right(3, 5)
7 s 6= add(a, s) 6=-add(h1, h2, h3)
8 s ⊆ add(a, s) ∧ s 6= add(a, s) ∧-I(6, 7)
infer s ⊂ add(a, s) ⇔ -E-right(2, 8)
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card=0-E
s:A-set ; card s = 0
s = { }
from s:A-set; card s = 0
1 { }:A-set { }-form
2 { } = { } =-self-I(1)
3 card { } = 0 ⇒ {} = { } ⇒-I-left-vac(2)
4 from a:A; s ′:A-set; card s ′ = 0 ⇒ s ′ = { }; a /∈ s ′
4.1 card s ′:N card-form(4.h2)
4.2 succ(card s ′) 6= 0 succ 6= 0(4.1)
4.3 card add(a, s ′) = succ(card s ′) card-defn-add(4.h1, 4.h2, 4.h4)
4.4 succ(card s ′):N succ-form(4.1)
4.5 card add(a, s ′) 6= 0 =-subs-left(b)(4.4, 4.3, 4.2)
4.6 ¬(card add(a, s ′) = 0) unfolding(4.5)
infer card add(a, s ′) = 0 ⇒ add(a, s ′) = { } ⇒-I-right-vac(4.6)
5 card s = 0 ⇒ s = { } set-indn(h1, 3, 4)
infer s = { } ⇒-E-left(5, h2)
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